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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, trade secrecy has come to the fore, both domestically and 
internationally. For technological firms, trade secrecy protection has always served 
an important role: it is cheaper than patents, can last longer than the 20-year term 
of patent protection, and it covers intellectual contributions that are not advanced 
enough or sufficiently inventive to be considered patentable.1 Many of the changes 
of the last few decades have made trade secrecy rights even more critical. A series 
of cases restricting the reach of patent law has put new emphasis on finding 
alternatives to patenting.2 Because jobs no longer last a lifetime, more employees 
move from firm to firm, possibly taking valuable information with them.3 Modern 
business practices, including especially value chain production methods, spread 
information around the globe from creators to manufacturers, distributors, sellers, 
and maintenance organizations.4 Most importantly, developments in computer 
technology, robotics, and manufacturing create more situations where information 
can be feasibly protected by secrecy.5 At the same time, these technologies can 
also make it easier to take valuable information without authorization.  U.S. losses 
due to trade secrecy theft are thought to be in the neighborhood of $300 billion per 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., John E. Jankowski, Business Use of Intellectual Property Protection Documented in NSF 
Survey, INFOBRIEF 1 (Feb. 2012), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf12307/nsf12307.pdf; 
Wesley M Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. 
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NBER Working Paper No. 7552 (2000), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf.  
2 For example, the interest in trade secrecy in the biotechnology field, see, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II 
& Arti K. Rai, Are Trade Secrets Delaying Biosimilars?, 348 SCIENCE 188 (2015), has coincided with 
the limits that Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013), imposed 
on patenting genetic materials.  Similarly, Alice Corp. Party. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 
(2014), which limits patents in the software and business method arena, may put new emphasis on trade 
secrecy in those sectors.  Significantly, analogous limitations apply in European law. See Monsanto 
Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, Case C-428/08 (July, 6 2010) (ECJ) (limiting the scope of gene patents); 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199, art. 52(c) (barring 
patents on business methods and computer programs). 
3 Benjamin A. Campbell et al., Who Leaves, Where to, and Why Worry? Employee Mobility, 
Entrepreneurship and Effects on Source Firm Performance, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 65 (2012); see 
also OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. 
TRADE SECRETS (2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_the_
theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION  AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INNOVATIVE PEOPLE: MOBILITY OF SKILLED PERSONNEL IN NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS (2001), 
http://eprints.utas.edu.au/1324/1/oecd-ip-7-13.pdf.   
4 Gary Gereffi & Joonkoo Lee, Why the World Suddenly Cares About Global Supply Chains, 48 J. 
SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 24 (2012). 
5 See generally, David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1092–95 (2012) (citing new technology, a changing work environment, 
increasing damage awards, widespread adoption of uniform state trade secrets law, expanding scope of 
protection, the rise of international threats, and changes in patent law as factors that may place trade 
secrets at risk). 
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year;6 one source estimates these losses to represent between 1 and 3 percent of 
U.S. GDP.7  
The United States has a long tradition of trade secrecy protection, initially 
through state common law,8 and later through the states’ adoption of the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),9 their enactment of criminal misappropriation 
statutes,10 and their creation of systems to exclude goods made with 
misappropriated information.11 At the federal level, the Unfair Import Trade 
Practices Act of 1930 (Tariff Act) empowers, through so-called section 337 
actions, the International Trade Commission (ITC) to order the exclusion from the 
U.S. market of goods made through unfair practices, including the marketing of 
goods embodying misappropriated trade secrets.12 In 1996, Congress passed the 
Economic Espionage Act (EEA) to impose strong criminal penalties for 
unauthorized takings benefiting foreign governments (“espionage”) or private 
                                                 
6 See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, S. Rep. No. 114-220 1, 2 (2016), 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/114th-congress/senate-report/220/1 [hereinafter DTSA 
Senate Rep.]. 
7 See CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTERPRISE AND TRADE, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE SECRECY 
THEFT: A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANIES TO SAFEGUARD TRADE SECRETS AND MITIGATE POTENTIAL 
THREATS 3 (2014), https://create.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CREATe.org-PwC-Trade-Secret-
Theft-FINAL-Feb-2014_01.pdf.  
8 See, e.g., Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523, 527 (1837) (citing Bryson v. Whitehead, 1 Sim. & S. 74, 
57 Eng. Rep.29 (1822)) (representing the first case to address trade secrecy protection in the United 
States, concerning “the defendant’s exclusive and secret art of making chocolate”); RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS, §§ 757–58 (AM. LAW INST. 1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION (AM. LAW INST. 1995). See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, A Legal Tangle of Secrets and 
Disclosures in Trade: Tabor v. Hoffman and Beyond, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE 
CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 271 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, eds., 2014). 
9 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990) [hereinafter the UTSA]. Two 
states have yet to adopt the UTSA: Massachusetts and New York. North Carolina has a statute, but it is 
not considered to be an official adopter of the UTSA. Texas was the last state to adopt the UTSA. See 
generally, Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secrecy Law and Why Courts Commit Error 
When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010). 
10 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (West 2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §31.05 (West 1994); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:20–1 (West 2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW §165.07. 
11 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1401–28 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.330.020 (2011). Some 
states also use analogues of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006), which permits 
the FTC to deal with unfair methods of competition, to exclude goods from commerce.  See generally 
Sean A. Pager & Eric Priest, Unfair Competition as Global Governance (forthcoming). 
12 19 U.S.C. § 1337. See generally, J. Stephen Simms, Scope of Action against Unfair Import Trade 
Practices under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 4 NW. J. INT’L L. 234 (1982) (giving the example 
of In Certain Copper Rod Production Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv., I.T.R.D. (1980) (BNA). 
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parties (“theft”).13 In 2016, Congress amended the EEA to include the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) to add a private cause of action for trade secrecy 
misappropriation.14   
Throughout this time, courts in the United States have generally regarded 
the geographic scope of governmental authority to regulate misappropriation as 
exceedingly broad, reaching the acquisition, disclosure, or use of trade secret 
information even in transborder cases—that is, even when some or most of the 
activity occurs outside the United States. An example coming from state law is 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Industries, Inc.15 In that case, the 
defendant, a Korean firm, had received information on DuPont’s secret methods  
for manufacturing Kevlar (the fiber in bullet-proof vests). The court, deciding the 
case under Virginia law, used its equitable powers to order the defendant to cease 
using the knowledge to make rival products, including in Korea (where one use 
was to ensure the safety of the Korean army).   
In the federal context, section 337 actions have also applied U.S. law to 
foreign conduct. Thus, in TianRui Group Co.  v. International Trade 
Commission,16 the Federal Circuit approved the ITC’s decision to exclude goods 
that were made in China based on information the producer took, in China, from a 
U.S. manufacturer because under U.S. federal law, the taking was considered a 
misappropriation. In Sino Legend Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Commission,17 
under similar facts, the Federal Circuit approved an ITC order excluding Chinese 
goods even though a Chinese court had already decided that the activity leading up 
to their production, which all took place in China, did not amount to trade secret  
misappropriation under Chinese law.   
As for the EEA, its text explicitly extends its reach to specified conduct 
occurring outside of the United States. It permits criminal prosecution whenever 
the offender is a citizen or permanent resident of the United States or an act in 
                                                 
13 Economic Espionage Act, Pub. L. 104–294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996 codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1831–39).  
See also the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. §1030 (2008) (governing computer 
hacking). The Economic Espionage Act has been amended several times to extend its reach and 
enhance deterrence. See Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, H.R. 
6029 (2013) (amending § 1831 and 1832 to increase the maximum penalties); Theft of Trade Secrets 
Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, 2012 S. 3642, 126 Stat. 1627 (2012) (amending 18 
U.S.C. § 1832(a) to include the activity at issue in United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 
2012), where secret information was downloaded but not used in commerce; the amendment changed 
the phrase "that is related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in foreign 
commerce” to "that is related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign 
commerce”). 
14 Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016). In a few situations, courts 
have interpreted novel interpretations of federal unfair competition and consumer law to reach trade 
secret misappropriation, see, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Lopez, 948 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Mich. 1996). 
15 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
16 TianRui Grp. Co.  v. Int’l Trade Comm’n 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
17 Sino Legend Chem. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 623 F. App'x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub 
nom., Sino Legend (Zhangjiagang) Chem. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 711 (2017). 
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furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States;18 in fact, a great 
number of EEA prosecutions involve foreign entities, especially in China.19 While 
few cases under the DTSA amendment to the EEA have been fully adjudicated, 
courts could easily consider this provision as approving an equally (or more) 
extensive reach on the civil side. 
It is not surprising that U.S courts would apply domestic laws in this far-
reaching way. In the past, most cases were largely about local activity, where the 
law of that locality (usually the forum) was assumed to apply, even if the case 
included transnational elements.20 Furthermore, until fairly recently, other nations 
were under no compulsion to recognize rights in trade secrets. While international 
law has long included intellectual property obligations, the oldest agreement 
regulating technological information—the Paris Convention—never required more 
than protection against “unfair competition.” That term was not defined and the 
Convention elucidated it with particulars that involved only acts more akin to 
 
                                                 
18 18 U.S.C. § 1837; See generally Robin J. Effron, Secrets and Spies: Extraterritorial Application of 
the Economic Espionage Act and the TRIPS Agreement, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1477 (2003).   
19 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Orly Lobel, Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric: Equating 
Trade Secrecy with National Security, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 428 (2016).  
 
20 Cf. Commission Regulation 864/2007 art. 8.1, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L199) 40, 45 
(EC) (“The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an 
intellectual property right shall be the law of the country for which protection is claimed.”); id. Recital 
(26) (“Regarding infringements of intellectual property rights, the universally acknowledged principle 
of the lex loci protectionis should be preserved.”); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works art. 5, July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31. [hereinafter Berne Convention] (“[T]he extent 
of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be 
governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.”). 
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trademark infringement than trade secret misappropriation.
21 Even after the TRIPS Agreement went into force in 1995,22 its provision on 
trade secrets (labeled “undisclosed information” in TRIPS) was not widely 
implemented.23 With other countries lacking robust protection, courts may have 
seen reliance on U.S. law as the only way to protect information developers.24  
Alternatively, U.S. courts may have applied U.S. law on the (erroneous) theory it 
was identical to foreign law.25 After all, the TRIPS Agreement essentially tracks 
the main features of the UTSA right of action by requiring protection for 
information that has “commercial value because it is secret” against “being 
disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner 
contrary to honest commercial practices.”26  
For many years, the Supreme Court seemingly approved the application 
of U.S. intellectual property law to foreign activities when there was a U.S. link of 
some type. In a 1952 decision, Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., the Court held that 
U.S. trademark law (the Lanham Act)27 could be applied to the unauthorized use 
of the Bulova mark on goods that were manufactured and sold in Mexico. The 
Court explained—in a sentence susceptible to a rather expansive interpretation—
that acts committed abroad legally “lose that character when they become part of 
an unlawful scheme.”28 To be sure, as other countries have begun to protect trade 
                                                 
21 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10bis, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 
828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (mentioning “in particular” acts that create confusion, 
mislead the public, or discredit the right holder). 
22 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 39.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter the TRIPS Agreement or TRIPS]. 
23 Id. art. 39.  For example, even as late as 2013, a study by the European Commission revealed that in 
the EU, national trade secrecy laws had developed unevenly, see Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business 
Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure, at 4, COM 
(2013) 813 final (Nov. 28, 2013). 
24 Cf., e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 
390 (1940); Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Inc., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 596 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (adopting various approaches to 
apply U.S. copyright law to global infringements). 
25 See, eg., TianRui Grp. Co.  v. Int’l Trade Comm’n 661 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2011). (“TianRui 
has failed to identify a conflict between the principles of misappropriation that the Commission applied 
and Chinese trade secret law.”). 
26 The negotiation history of the provision is recounted in SHARON K. SANDEEN, The Limits of Trade 
Secrecy Law: Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act on Which it is 
Based, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 
537 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds. 2011). 
27 Lanham (Trademark) Act, Pub. L. 79–489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 
U.S. 280, (1952). 
28 Bulova, 344 U.S. at 287. 
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secrets in the new millennium, the need for the United States to apply its own law 
to police the world has diminished. In 2012, the United States began using its 
Trade Representative’s annual report on global intellectual property deficiencies to 
draw attention to the inadequacy of trade secrecy protection in other countries and 
to threaten the withdrawal of trade preferences from nations that failed to enact 
laws the United States regards as sufficiently protective.29 When it also began to 
insert trade secrecy obligations into regional free trade agreements,30 other 
countries took note. Whereas the members of the EU once had extremely disparate 
trade secrecy laws,31 by 2016, the EU complied with U.S. wishes to improve trade 
secret protection and promulgated a Directive on trade secrecy for the member 
states to implement over the next two years.32 China is likewise reviewing its 
position.33 Significantly, however, none of these countries were required to enact 
laws identical to those of the United States. Although these laws are most likely 
TRIPS compliant, TRIPS is a minimum standard agreement.34 Thus, countries can, 
and do, take different approaches to such questions as adjusting the balance 
between trade secrecy and patent rights, nourishing the public domain, protecting 
employee mobility, facilitating whistleblowers, and dealing with good faith users 
of misappropriated information.  
                                                 
29 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U. S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 17–18 (2012), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf; OFFICE OF THE U. S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 20–23, (2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015-Special-
301-Report-FINAL.pdf; OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 
REPORT, 20–21, (2016), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-Report.pdf..   
30 See., e.g., TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, art. 18.78, Feb. 4, 2016, 
https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/intellectual-property-3479efdc7adf#.56hzs77ee. See 
also U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 28-30, (2013), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/2013-us-ipec-joint-strategic-
plan.pdf. 
31 See supra note 23. 
32 Directive 2016/943, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016, on the Protection 
of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful 
Acquisition, Use and Disclosure, 2013 O.J. (L 157) 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32016L0943  [hereinafter EU Directive]. 
33 See, e.g., Ping Xiong, China’s Approach to Trade Secrets Protection: Is a Uniform Trade Secrets 
Law in China Needed?, in THE INTERNET AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 254–55 (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, eds., 2016). 
34 J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS 
Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW. 345, 351 (1995). 
In this changed atmosphere, the practice of viewing U.S. law as available 
to protect trade secrets worldwide demands further examination. Arguably, an 
analogy could be made to the way that applicable law is handled in the copyright 
and patent context. There, the focus is on the product (creative expression or 
invention), and each country uses its own law to determine the rights that attach to 
use of that product in its territory, irrespective of where it was developed.
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35 However, that traditional territorial approach works poorly for trade 
secrets. Trade secrecy protection does not so much focus on the product (the 
information) because almost anything can be a trade secret. Rather, the emphasis 
is on specific activities: how well the developer maintained the information 
(whether reasonable efforts were made to preserve secrecy) and how the user 
obtained the information (whether it was lawfully acquired or misappropriated). 
Applying the law of one country to activities that arise in another raises 
considerable conceptual difficulties when the laws of the two countries are 
different—could, for example, information that is accessible in one country 
nonetheless be regarded as secret in another? And because the place of use may 
not be foreseeable at the time that secrecy must be maintained or the information 
appropriated, this approach also poses problems for information developers and 
users.36   
Significantly, the Supreme Court has in recent years embarked on a 
vigorous agenda to prevent, as it stated in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
“unintended clashes between [U.S.] laws and those of other nations,”37 and has 
warned that U.S. intellectual property law “does not rule the world.”38 The 
Supreme Court has stressed that courts can apply legislation to acts outside the 
United States only when the statute evinces clear congressional intent that it be 
accorded extraterritorial effect or the focus of the legislation is on domestic 
activity (meaning the application is not, in fact, extraterritorial).39 Even so, courts 
consider other aspects of prescriptive comity before applying a U.S. statute in a 
particular case.40   If U.S. law is not applied, the case is dismissed.  The outcome 
                                                 
35 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 27.1 (requiring WTO countries to recognize patent rights 
without discrimination as to the place of invention); id. art 3. (requiring national treatment); Berne 
Convention, supra note 20, art. 3.1 (extending protection to authors who are nationals of the Berne 
Union and to works first published in the Union).  
36 Trademark law shares some of the same features: protection hinges largely on specific activities 
(establishing the meaning of a mark, differentiating it from other meanings, registering the mark, using 
it to confuse customers). In general, the applicable law is the place where these actions occur. Rights to 
well-known marks are something of an exception, but even there, the law of the place of use is applied 
and protection depends on whether the mark is known in that jurisdiction, see Paris Convention, supra 
note 21, art. 6bis; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 16. Tellingly, transnational cases pose 
especially difficult questions for trademarks as well, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private 
International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 
775–76 (2009). 
37 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (quoting Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’r v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).  
38 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007). 
39 RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016). 
40 Courts have used prescriptive comity to limit application of a statute, even when the presumption has 
been rebutted, see F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164–65 (2004). Courts 
have used a similar concept to limit application of a statute, even when a transaction falls within the 
domestic application of claims that were “predominantly foreign.” See Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. 
Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 216 (2d Cir. 2014); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 204, cmts. b, c, d (AM. LAW INST. 2017).  
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in cases such as Sino Legend raise such clashes—as can be discerned from the 
decision of Chinese Ministry of Commerce to file an amicus brief in that case 
seeking to overturn the decision.41 Given the Supreme Court’s concerns and the 
emerging differences among national intellectual property legislation, the time is 
ripe to consider the appropriate extraterritorial reach of section 337, the DTSA, 
and state law. 
This paper, authored jointly by an intellectual property professor and a 
conflicts scholar, is among the first to do so. There is considerable case law and a 
growing literature on the substantive provisions of trade secrecy law,42 but very 
little analysis of either the extraterritorial application of U.S. trade secrecy law or 
the related question of what law should apply in a transnational trade secrecy case.  
To the extent that these issues have been discussed in intellectual property, the 
focus has mainly been on patent, trademark, and copyright law.43 For example, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has considered private 
international law questions arising in connection with transnational patent, 
copyright, and trademark disputes.44 Additionally, the American Law Institute 
                                                 
41 Brief of the Trade Remedy and Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China Supporting a Rehearing En Banc in the Federal Circuit, Sino Legend Chemical Co. 
Ltd. v. ITC, 2016 WL 1050786 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  
42 See, e.g., THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Katherine Strandburg, eds., 2011); Sharon K. Sandeen, The DTSA: 
The Litigator's Full-Employment Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 308 (2015); Robert G. Bone, 
The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (2014) (introducing a 
symposium issue on trade secrecy and summarizing the scholarship); Douglas C. Lippoldt & Mark F. 
Schultz, Uncovering Trade Secrets—An Empirical Assessment of Economic Implications of Protection 




43 See, e.g., Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 
O.J. (EC); Council Directive 93/83, art. 1(2)(b) of 27 September 1993 on the Coordination of Certain 
Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and 
Cable Retransmission, 1993 O.J. (L 248).  The EU has also tried to avoid conflicts issues by enacting 
EU-wide rights. See, e.g., Council Regulation  2015/2424 of 12 December 2015 on the European Union 
Trade Mark, 2015 O.J. (L 341) 21 (EU); THE EU UNITARY PATENT SYSTEM (Justine Pila & 
Christopher Wadlow eds., 2015). The EU has judicially promulgated EU-wide definitions of key 
concepts, see Infopaq Int'l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, Case C-5/08 (July 16, 2009)(ECJ); 
Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace –Svaz softwarová asociace-Svaz softwarové ochrany v. Ministerstvo 
kultury, Case C-393/09 (Dec. 22, 2010) (ECJ).  Congress has similarly addressed some transnational 
intellectual property issues. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(f), (g). 
44 World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the 
Protection of Marks, and other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet, WIPO Pub. 845(E) 
(Oct.3,2001) [hereinafter Joint Recommendation], 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/845/pub845.pdf;  Standing Committee on the Law of 
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications, SCT/25/3 (Feb. 11, 2011) (noting, 
among other issues, new problems arising from internet auction sites); see, e.g., WIPO-ILA Seminar on 
IP and Private International Law, WIPO-ILA/IP/GE/15/INF/1 (Jan. 16, 2015);  see also id., 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=35183 (listing related documents). 
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(ALI), in parallel with groups in Europe and Asia, has developed principles 
focused on the resolution of only these categories of cases.45 In some jurisdictions, 
conflict issues in trade secrecy cases may have received short shrift because it is 
often unclear whether these cases sound in tort, contract, or property.46 In the 
United States, trade secrecy also may have received lesser attention because its 
importance has only recently emerged. In addition, U.S. courts have apparently 
taken the position that they need to provide global protection when other countries 
do not. Alternatively, they have tended to assume that the laws of countries with 
trade secrecy protection are so similar, the application of U.S. law is not 
controversial. 
To begin the discussion on extraterritoriality and applicable law in trade 
secrecy cases, Part I provides a short survey of national trade secrecy laws. It 
demonstrates the many ways in which even countries that all operate under the 
TRIPS Agreement and generally agree on the availability of protection can 
nonetheless make divergent policy choices and enact laws that differ in critical 
detail. In short, this Part exposes how clashes among national trade secrecy laws 
can easily occur. Part II reviews the limits that modern courts have imposed on the 
extraterritorial reach of federal legislation and elucidates the Supreme Court’s two-
step approach to the question whether Congress intended an enactment to reach 
activity outside the United States. Part III applies this analysis to trade secrecy 
cases:  Section A considers section 337 actions, such as TianRui, and Section B 
looks at the fact patterns that arise under the DTSA. These Sections demonstrate 
how the Supreme Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence delimits the reach of 
federal statutory law. Section C deals with state trade secrecy law and the question 
of whether states can fill any gaps by furnishing a cause of action in situations that 
federal law does not reach. We note that states do not tend to approach the issue as 
one of extraterritoriality, as does the Supreme Court with federal statutes; instead, 
they frame the question as one of the choice of applicable law. In Section D, we 
revisit the DTSA. Given its roots in state trade secrecy law, we suggest that a 
traditional choice of law approach should be considered in federal trade secret 
                                                 
45 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, 
CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008) [hereinafter ALI Principles]; 
JURGEN BASEDOW & PEDRO DE MIGUEL ASENSIO, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
THE CLIP PRINCIPLES AND COMMENTARY (2013); Toshiyuki Kono, Cross-Border Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property: Japanese Law and Practice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CROSS-BORDER 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Paul Torremans, ed., 2015) (citing projects in Japan and 
Korea). 
46 See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 311 (2008). For example, the EU’s conventions on choice of law require characterization of the 
case. See Rome Conventions, Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177/6) (EC); 
Council Regulation, 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations 
(Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC); Roland Knaak et al., Comments of the Max Planck Institute for 
Innovation and Competition of 3 June 2014 on the Proposal of the European Commission for a 
Directive on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) 
Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure, COM(2013) 813 final,  44 INT’L REV. 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. & COMPETITION L. 953 ¶ 17 (2014) [hereinafter Max Planck Comments]. The 
2016 Directive on trade secrets is also silent on the issue, even though it contemplates trade secrecy 
cases. See EU Directive, supra note 32, Recitals (4) and (8).   
10https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol8/iss2/4
275                          CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW                       [265:275]               
 
 
misappropriation cases.    
Our extraterritorial analyses often turn on the existence of a “U.S. trade 
secret.”
47 This statutory interpretation will often benefit U.S. trade secrecy 
holders more than it will benefit foreigners. Thus, it may have implications 
regarding the antidiscrimination provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.48 For those 
situations in which we propose a choice of law rule—whether it is the law of the 
place where a trade secret is developed or where the relevant conduct takes 
place—goods from different countries will be treated differently, arguably in 
violation of the nondiscrimination provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT).49 For all these cases, we offer interpretive guidance that 
endeavors to soften the tension with these international obligations. However, a 
full examination of the international issues awaits a future publication. 
 
II. TRADE SECRECY LAW 
 
Were all countries to agree on the law, policies, and importance of 
enforcing trade secrecy protection, the application of one country’s law to events 
that happen elsewhere would be of little moment: no matter which country 
entertained a case, the results would be identical and the same policies furthered. 
As noted above, trade secrecy easily appears to be an area of law where conflicts 
are absent, because the general contours of the law vary little as between the states 
of the United States, as reflected in the Restatements and the UTSA. The TRIPS 
Agreement and the EU Directive are similar as well.50 The details, interpretation, 
and application can, however, vary considerably. For simplicity, the focus here is 
on (1) the TRIPS Agreement because all WTO members must conform to it; (2) 
the UTSA because so many U.S. states have adopted it and because it furnished 
the basis for the DTSA;51 and (3) the EU Directive because it suggests the 
approach other countries may consider as they come up to (what the U.S. regards 
as) international standards.52  
                                                 
47 We define a U.S. trade secret infra at notes 244–250. 
48 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 3 (guaranteeing that foreign nationals will be treated no less 
favorably than each country’s own nationals); see, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—
Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS174/R (adopted Mar. 15, 2005). 
49 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Art. I, Art. III:4,  Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT] (prohibiting discrimination based on the geographic source of goods).  
50 TianRui, 551 F.3d, at 1331 & 1333. 
51 See, e.g., DTSA Senate Rep., supra note 6, at 10 (noting intent to bring the terms used in alignment 
with the UTSA). 
52 For a more detailed comparison between the DTSA and the EU Directive, see Sharon K. Sandeen, 
Implementing the EU Trade Secret Directive: A View from the United States, 39 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 4 (2017). 
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The TRIPS Agreement is fairly stark in its mandate. It requires protection 
against unfair competition as defined in the Paris Convention, and then goes on to 
provide (in a section the EU Directive largely tracks53) that: 
Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing 
information lawfully within their control from being disclosed 
to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a 
manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long as such 
information: 
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the 
precise configuration and assembly of its components, 
generally known among or readily accessible to persons 
within the circles that normally deal with the kind of 
information in question;  
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and  
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the 
circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the 
information, to keep it secret.54 
 
The elements of the cause of action are thus (1) the information must be 
secret—or as the UTSA puts it, the information “must derive independent 
economic value… from not being generally known. . . and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means””;55 (2) it must be subject to reasonable steps to 
maintain its secrecy;56 (3) it must be taken in a manner contrary to honest business 
practices—or in UTSA terminology, it must be “taken by improper means” or 
“misappropriated”;57 and (4) it must be disclosed, acquired, or used by others.58 
                                                 
53 EU Directive, supra note 32, arts. 2(1) & 4. 
54 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 39.2. A footnote to “honest commercial practices” provides:  
 
For the purpose of this provision, “a manner contrary to honest commercial 
practices” shall mean at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of 
confidence and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of 
undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in 
failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition. 
 
In addition, art. 39.3 requires WTO members to regard undisclosed data used to obtain premarketing 
approval in each country. These cases are uniquely local and beyond the scope of this article.  
55 UTSA, supra note 9, § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985). 
56 Id. at § 1(4(ii). 
57 Id. at § 1(1) & (2). 
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The similarity among these provisions is not coincidental. The United 
States was instrumental in adding trade secrecy to the agenda for TRIPS 
negotiations and the U.S. experience with domestic protection created a useful 
template for TRIPS drafters.59 In turn, the EU relied on TRIPS and the UTSA in 
framing its Directive. From a theoretical perspective, the law is nicely drawn. By 
its terms, it targets valuable advances that do not (or do not yet) qualify for other 
intellectual property rights. As with other intellectual property, it protects those 
who invested in their creation from free riders, who might otherwise take the 
information and use it to compete down the price to the point where the developer 
would be unable recover its costs. By providing the assurance of a legal right of 
action if reasonable (but not comprehensive) measures are taken to protect 
secrecy, the law also allows innovators to save money on extensive self-help 
measures and likely results in greater output than would complete secrecy. With 
trade secrecy protection, innovators can transmit technical information to 
investors, licensees, fabricators, distributors, and potential customers with 
assurance that legal action can be taken in case of loss.60 Furthermore, 
entrepreneurs can more safely enter into joint ventures and spin off businesses that 
depend on sharing know-how. Start-ups lacking substantial resources can rely on 
the automatic protection afforded by trade secrecy law instead of absorbing the 
expense of obtaining patent protection. 
But there is another side to trade secrecy protection.61 Most obviously, 
the stronger the protection, the more likely that a creator will prefer it to 
patenting.62  From a societal perspective, however, patenting is superior for it 
requires disclosure of the technical information protected.63 That allows others to 
avoid the cost of recreating it. Moreover, it gives others the opportunity to take the 
advance in directions the inventor did not consider and permits researchers to 
                                                                                                                
58 The UTSA envisions enjoining even threatened misappropriation, UTSA, supra note 9, § 2(a). It 
does, however, require that the acquirer “can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,” § 
1(4)(i). The EU Directive, supra note 32, adds the fourth point in art. 4(1).    
59 Reichman, supra note 34, at 377; Alan S. Gutterman, International Intellectual Property: A Summary 
of Recent Developments and Issues for the Coming Decade, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 335, 353–54 (1992). Congress’s concerns about trade secrecy theft can also be gleaned from 
the legislative history of the EEA, which was enacted almost contemporaneously with completion of 
the TRIPS Agreement. See S. Rep. No. 104-359 (1996); H.R. Rep. No. 104-788 (1996), reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N 4021; Effron, supra note 18, at 1486.   
60 See generally Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 
43 (2007). 
61 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know A Trade Secret? How Article 2b 
Will Make Licensing Trade Secrets Easier (but Innovation More Difficult), 87 CAL. L. REV. 191, 246–
49 (1999); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed to Hide Them? 
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 38-42 (1998). 
62 See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 
317, 375–79 (2015). 
63 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
13Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
[265:278]                CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW  278 
 
 
build on the underlying science and to publish their findings, safe in the 
knowledge that valuable applications can be protected with patents. In addition, 
disclosure allows government to regulate use of the invention in order to protect 
safety, health, and the environment. Patent protection is also limited to a finite 
term of years. When the patent expires, the information is available to the public 
for free use. By contrast, information that is secret cannot be freely repurposed, 
advanced, regulated, or published. The secret can last far longer than the term of 
patent protection. To be sure, legal protection for secrets leads to more output and 
lower prices than requiring innovators to keep “real” secrets (i.e., to not reveal the 
information to anyone—if that were possible). However, prices are higher and 
output is less than if information regularly spills into the public domain. 
More troubling, many trade secrecy cases involve situations where an 
employee leaves one job and takes another in the field of his expertise, only to find 
that the move is challenged on trade secrecy grounds.64 In many cases, 
documentation is taken, but there are cases that concern information that is in the 
employee’s head—information that the employee may regard as part of his or her 
skill set, knowledge, and qualifications, but which the employer (and the law) 
deem to be proprietary.65 Zealous protection for trade secrets can thus interfere 
significantly with employee mobility. Employers may be reluctant to hire 
employees from positions where they learned secret information, lest they are later 
accused of using it in their own operations. With less opportunity to leverage job 
offers, salaries in high tech industries could decline, and with it, the inclination to 
invest in human capital (for example, to enroll in advanced programs in STEM 
subjects66). Paradoxically, stringent trade secrecy laws could also impinge upon a 
firm’s ability to restructure its operations and merge, divest, or spin off divisions.  
In the end, too much protection could harm innovation, for it could prevent 
employees from putting their talents to their highest and best uses, inhibit the flow 
of information within technical fields, and lock firms into suboptimal 
organizational structures.67   
Given the competing policies at stake in trade secrecy law, the delicate 
balance between secrecy and patenting, and the ambiguous effects of trade secrecy 
                                                 
64 James Pooley, TRADE SECRETS §5.01(2)(a) (2013) (“Most trade secret lawsuits involve employees 
allegedly using their former employer's secrets to benefit themselves or a competitor.”).  See, e.g., 
General Motors Corp. v. Lopez, 948 F.Supp. 684 (E.D.Mich. 1996) (concerning an employee who left 
GM in Michigan for employment with VW in Germany, taking along 20 cartons of GM documents).  
65 See generally Orly Lobel, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE 141–52 (2013); Orly Lobel, The New 
Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789 
(2015). 
66 STEM refers to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. 
67 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon 
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999). The effect of trade 
secrets on innovation appears to be heavily dependent on firm size, the pace of innovation in the field, 
industrial sector, and technological complexity. See Ivan P.L. Png, Law and Innovation: Evidence from 
State Trade Secrets Laws (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1755284.   
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on social welfare and scientific and technical progress, variations in protection are 
to be expected. And that is true even among states that have adopted the UTSA (or 
as James Pooley calls it, the “non-Uniform Trade Secrets Act”68) and certainly 
among countries subject to the barebones framework set out in TRIPS. Indeed, 
each element of protection offers jurisdictions opportunities to tailor the law to 
their own conceptions of the proper balance between private and public interests.69   
 Consider, to start, the question of what information can be protected. 
TRIPS, the UTSA, and the EU Directive require that the information be secret.  
But what sorts of information are covered? The first Restatement of Torts took a 
hard line on this issue and excluded protection for “ephemeral events.”70 Likewise, 
the examples in the UTSA include “a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique or process”71—in other words, technical information.72  
Nonetheless, U.S. states and the EU Directive tend to protect a broad range of 
materials, including customer lists and marketing strategies.73   
There is also a question whether the information that is protected must by 
positive or whether negative information—blind alleys (knowing what not to 
try)—are also protectable. Many U.S. states protect negative information, but such 
protection is not explicitly required by either TRIPS or contemplated by the 
UTSA.74 The EU Directive does not mention negative information. Indeed, its 
focus on “infringing goods” and the acquisition of information, suggests that it 
does not require member states to protect knowledge of dry holes.75 Clearly, the 
                                                 
68 James Pooley, The Top Ten Issues in Trade Secret Law, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1181, 1188 (1997). See 
also DTSA Senate Rep., supra note 6, at 2 (noting that even minor differences can be case-dispositive). 
69 See also Ivan P.L. Png, Secrecy and Patents: Evidence from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617266 (showing that the availability of strong 
trade secrecy led to more patenting is some industries, but not in complex technologies); Png, supra 
note 67, at 9–10 (listing the national differences the author exploited to study the effect of the strength 
of trade secrecy protection on innovation). 
70 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §757, cmt. b. (Am. Law Inst. 1939). 
71 UTSA, supra note 9, § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985). 
72 For a taste of the controversy, see Henry J. Silberberg and Eric G. Lardiere, Eroding Protection of 
Customer Lists and Customer Information Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 42 BUS. LAW. 487 
(1987). 
73 UTSA, supra note 9, § 1, cmt. 14. See, e.g., Zach Wolfe, Key Issues When Employees Leave to 
Compete, 52-FEB Hous. Law. 30 (2015) (noting that in Texas, customer lists can be protected as trade 
secrets). See also Pooley, supra note 68, at 1183 (noting that at one time, courts offered different levels 
of protection to hard (technical) and soft (marketing) information). EU Directive, supra note 32, Recital 
(2) refers to “a diverse range of information that extends beyond technological knowledge to 
commercial data such as information on customers and suppliers, business plans, and market research 
and strategies.” 
74 See generally Charles Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 387 (2007). 
75 EU Directive, supra note 32, arts. 2(4) & 4. 
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more expansive the protection, the more it interferes with employee mobility. A 
salesman, for example, is more able to change jobs if he does not have to worry 
about litigation over knowledge of his prior customers; it is easier for a scientist to 
take a new position if she is able, without incurring legal problems, to avoid 
redoing experiments she already knows do not work. 
Moving beyond the type of information, there are different approaches to 
how “secret” the information must be to merit protection. The TRIPS Agreement 
and the EU Directive use as a benchmark knowledge in circles that normally deal 
with the information, suggesting that if a group within an industry is using similar 
information, it cannot be protected.76 But the UTSA (in conformity with what was 
regarded as industry practice) considers a secret to be information that is not 
known to “other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or 
use.” 77 That approach is more protective of innovators as it permits small groups 
to safeguard their knowledge from new entrants. Furthermore, it allows plaintiffs 
to protect information even if they suspect that there are others in the industry who 
are relying on the same tacit knowledge. Jurisdictions that are interested in strong 
intellectual property rights are thus likely to adopt that sort of standard, while 
those that believe innovation is best promoted through vigorous competition 
will—like the EU—reject the idea that established participants can consider the 
information they are all using to be secret. 
TRIPS, the UTSA, and the EU Directive also specify that the information 
protected must not be “readily accessible.” 78 TRIPS, however, fails to define the 
term. Presumably it means that the information cannot be independently invented 
easily, but it is not clear whether it also means that it cannot be, perhaps with some 
difficulty, reverse engineered—figured out from public embodiments.79 To be 
sure, the EU Directive clarifies that both independent discovery and “observation, 
study, and disassembly” are lawful means of acquisition.80 U.S. law is in accord: 
the commentary to section 1 of the UTSA defines “proper means” to include such 
behaviors and the Restatement of Unfair Competition explicitly permits reverse 
engineering,81 as does the DTSA.82 Moreover, there is authority suggesting that the 
                                                 
76 EU Directive, supra note 32, art. 2 (1)(a). See also Pooley, supra note 68 at 1185 (noting that 
availability on the internet could destroy a trade secret, even if there is no evidence anyone has 
accessed the site). 
77 UTSA, supra note 9, § 1 (4)(i) (amended 1985). The DTSA puts this in the singular: another 
“person,” §1839(3)(B). 
78 UTSA, supra note 9, § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985); EU Directive, supra note 32, art. 2 (1)(a). 
79 Reichman, supra note 34, at 378. 
80 EU Directive, supra note 32, arts.  3(1)(b) & Recital (16) 
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 43 (Am. Law Inst. 1995). (“Independent 
discovery and analysis of publicly available products or information are not improper means of 
acquisition”). 
82 18 U.S.C. §1839 (6)(B) (2016).  
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permissibility of reverse engineering is constitutionally required in the United 
States.83 However, these provisions do not say when the effort to figure out the 
invention is so great, the information will not be regarded as readily accessible. 
Moreover, it is not clear whether the ability to acquire the information lawfully 
means it is to be considered public. Thus, there is a split among jurisdictions on 
whether misappropriation is actionable if the information could be reverse 
engineered, but that is not how the defendant acquired it.84 Nor is it evident 
whether the inability to readily access the information is part of the plaintiff’s 
affirmative case or a defense that the defendant bears the burden to prove.85 At the 
margin, these factors make a difference as to how much information is considered 
in the public domain.   
To many commentators, the most puzzling aspect of trade secrecy 
protection is the requirement that the secret be subject to reasonable efforts to 
protect it.86  As we saw, the TRIPS Agreement, the EU Directive and the UTSA 
envision such efforts. However, if one goal of the law is to relieve innovators of 
the burden of taking costly self-help measures, why should any effort be required? 
Arguably, it is socially useful to require employers to notify employees of trade 
secrets because that would alert the employees to potential mobility problems. But 
if that is the effort the law requires, it would make more sense to enforce trade 
secrets only against persons in a confidential relationship with the plaintiff. If, 
instead, the idea is to make sure the information is genuinely valuable and secret, 
the plaintiff could be required to prove that directly. The difficulty in justifying the 
reasonable efforts element adds another reason why jurisdictions differ on the 
specifics of trade secrecy protection. Some do not, in fact, require proof of such 
efforts—the Restatement of Unfair Competition, for example, does not.87  Some 
jurisdictions might look to a constellation of factors to determine the adequacy of 
the measures, but some might demand a showing that a confidentiality agreement 
was in place (and even then, there could be disagreement on whether the 
agreement must be explicit or can be implied from the circumstances).88  
                                                 
83 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476, 490 (1974); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989). 
84 See, e.g., Hecny Transp., Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is unimaginable that 
someone who steals property, business opportunities, and the labor of the firm's staff would get a free 
pass just because none of what he filched is a trade secret.”). 
85 Since the method of acquisition is uniquely in the defendant’s knowledge, it is likely a defense in 
many jurisdictions. However, the EU Directive suggests that the means of acquisition is part of the 
plaintiff’s case, art. 11(1)(c). 
86 See generally Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation and the Requirement of Reasonable 
Secrecy Precautions, in Dreyfuss and Strandburg, supra note 42, at 46. 
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 39 (Am. Law Inst. 1995). 
88 Max Planck Comments, supra note 46, ¶ 19 (noting that under TRIPS, some countries require 
explicit measures regarding confidentiality).  In China, for example, most employees are liable only if 
there is an explicit contract, but senior managing staff have a statutory duty to keep secrets. See Xiong, 
supra note 33, at 256. 
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The misappropriation element—acquisition by improper means—can also 
be subject to differing interpretations. First, the TRIPS provision and the EU 
Directive refer to “honest commercial practices.”89 If the standard is derived from 
local practices, there is obviously room for jurisdictional variation.  Second, there 
is the question alluded to in connection with accessibility: whether independent 
invention and reverse engineering are proper methods of acquisition. For 
independent invention, the answer is clear: it is never considered improper.90 In 
most cases, the second inventor will expend as many resources as the first. Thus, 
there will have been no free ride; because both parties must recover development 
costs, price competition will not undercut the originator. It is, however, somewhat 
harder for a jurisdiction to choose a position on reverse engineering. Reverse 
engineering does not usually cost as much as inventing anew, so if it is 
permissible, there is an element of a free ride. Jurisdictions intent on furnishing 
strong protection are thus more likely to find reverse engineering a form of 
misappropriation or allow reverse engineering to be restricted by contract.91 
Similarly, they may find otherwise lawful activity, such as flying over a plant and 
photographing it, to constitute misappropriation.92 On the other hand, if 
technology is protected against reverse engineering, more innovators will prefer it 
to patenting. Jurisdictions seeking to promote disclosure and competition will 
therefore regard reverse engineering as proper.93 Some may even go further and 
specifically require a heightened showing of intent.94   
Jurisdictions can similarly differ on what is known as “tippee liability.” 
Under certain circumstances, the UTSA, the TRIPS Agreement, and the EU 
Directive impose liability on a person or firm (the tippee) that acquired a trade 
secret from the party who took it (the tipper). However, the circumstances are 
different in the various instruments. TRIPS requires liability only when the third 
party knew or was grossly negligent in failing to know that the information was 
misappropriated;95 the UTSA and the EU Directive make actionable acquisition of 
                                                 
89 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 39(2); EU Directive, supra note 32, arts. 3(1)(d) & 4(2)(b).  
See also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS § 2.486 (4th 
ed. 2012). 
90 See, e.g., EU Directive, supra note 32, Recital (16) and art. 3(1)(a). 
91 See, e.g., Max Planck Comments, supra note 46, ¶ 37. 
92 See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). 
93 For a discussion of the approaches, see Rockwell Graphic Systems v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 
174 (7th Cir. 1991).Or they can split the difference by enforcing contracts that prohibit reverse 
engineering, In the United States, reverse engineering can be prohibited by contract. See Bowers v. 
Baystate Technologies, 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); EU Directive, supra note 32, Recital (16) and 
art. 4(3)(c). 
94 EU Directive, supra note 32, art. 14(1). For example, The EU Directive allows member states to limit 
damages to employees when they act without intent. 
95 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 39 n.10. 
18https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol8/iss2/4
283                          CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW                       [265:283]               
 
 
information by a person who knew or had reason to know of the 
misappropriation.96 The latter formulation gives states leeway to decide for 
themselves what the tippee should reasonably have known. Jurisdictions can 
similarly differ on when the tippee needs to have known of the misappropriation.  
The UTSA allows for the possibility that the tippee invested in the information in 
reliance on its free availability. Thus, it makes the tippee liable only if it knew of 
the problem before a material change in position.97 TRIPS is silent on the matter, 
but the implication of the EU Directive, which considers the use of the information 
unlawful, suggests that the tippee is liable no matter when it learned of the 
problem.98 
Further, there is the question of what constitutes misappropriation 
(“infringement” in the parlance of the EU Directive). The TRIPS Agreement gives 
WTO members considerable flexibility. Protection for trade secrets appears in a 
section that, by its terms, is intended to expand on the Paris Convention’s concepts 
of unfair competition and honest business practices. Thus, a member could 
interpret the provision as envisioning that the use must be rivalrous (i.e. head-to-
head competition).99 For example, a jurisdiction could consider it nonactionable if 
the defendant acquired the information for purely comparative purposes (to 
determine, for example, the acceptability of the acquirer’s own product or whether 
it is worth buying from the trade secret holder).100   
But jurisdictions could equally decide to impose liability even when there 
is less obvious competition. Under the EU Directive, the mere acquisition of the 
trade secret seems to be enough to trigger liability.101 But that is not clear. The 
legislation appears aimed at protecting the power of creators to recoup the costs of 
innovation and protecting incentives to innovate,102 so it is possible the provision 
can be interpreted to require competitive use.103 Likewise, U.S. law can be 
construed in different ways. The UTSA speaks of improper acquisition not 
followed by disclosure or use as sufficient for, at least, injunctive relief;104 it only 
appears to require the secret to be of the sort that permits others to “obtain 
                                                 
96 UTSA, supra note 9, § 1 (2)(ii)(B) (amended 1985); EU Directive, supra note 32, art. 4(4). 
97 UTSA, supra note 9, § 1(2)(ii)(C) (amended 1985). 
98 EU Directive, supra note 32, art. 4(4).  However, the Directive permits the court to alter the remedies 
in cases of good faith acquisition. Recital (29) and art. 13(3)(a). 
99 See, e.g., United Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys. Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1984) (no 
competition between the U.S.GA and a firm that sold handicaps using the U.S.G.A’s formula). 
100 See, e.g., Omitech Int’l Inc. v. The Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316 (5th Cir. 1994). 
101 EU Directive, supra note 32, art. 4(1). 
102 Id., Recitals (1), (2), and (4). 
103 Much of Chinese trade secrecy law is similarly concerned with competitive behavior. Xiong, supra 
note 33, at 264. 
104 UTSA, supra note 9, §1(2) (i). 
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economic value from its disclosure or use.”105 Similarly, the Restatement of Unfair 
Competition refers to information that “can be used” and provides a “potential 
economic advantage.”106 Both phrases suggest that there is no need to show actual 
competitive use of the information; it is enough that such use is possible and not 
overly speculative.107  
Jurisdictions can have particularly divergent views on defenses to trade 
secrecy actions. The TRIPS Agreement provides no direction on this point (which 
is interesting, given that exceptions and limitations in patent, copyright, and 
trademark law are highly regulated).108 Aside from the independent invention and 
reverse engineering possibilities, the text of the UTSA and Restatement of Unfair 
Competition (as opposed to the associated commentary) is similarly devoid of 
guidance on allowable defenses. The DTSA, however differs from the UTSA in 
this respect: it includes a specific reference to “reverse engineering” and 
“independent development” as proper means of acquiring trade secrets and creates 
immunity from criminal or civil federal or state law for whistleblowers, such as 
employees who reveal trade secrets to federal, state officials, or to an attorney in 
order to report violations of law.109 Presumably, antitrust law could also affect the 
enforceability of provisions in trade secrecy agreements110 and labor law could 
impose limits on restraining employee mobility.111 In contrast, the EU Directive 
includes several explicit defenses. In addition to independent discovery and 
                                                 
105 Id., § 1(4)(i). See, e.g., InnoSys, Inc. v. Mercer 364 P.3d 1013, 1020 (Utah 2016) (secret revealed in 
a dispute about unemployment benefits). 
106 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 39 (emphasis added).  Significantly, the first 
Restatement of Torts protected information “used in one’s business.” § 757. 
107 The rights of non-practicing entities to relief have been in dispute for some time in patent law. See, 
e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 
F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).  Cf. David S. Levine and Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the 
Trade Secret Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 230, 245 (2015) (noting that the DTSA may lead 
to more litigation by so-called trolls).  In addition, some states have adopted (or flirted with) the view 
that there are situations where it is so inevitable that the secret will be disclosed that injunctive relief is 
necessary. See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F. 3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). The DTSA does not, 
however, appear to have accepted the inevitable disclosure doctrine, see David Bohrer, Threatened 
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets: Making A Federal (DTSA) Case Out of It, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 506, 509 (2017). 
108 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, arts. 13, 17, 30. 
109 18 U.S.C. § 1833(2), which applies in both state and federal cases. For federal claims, the revised 
statute also includes limits on injunctive relief designed to protect employees, 18 U.S.C. § 
1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I). 
110 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Miller, Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Secret Licensing: A Legal Review and 
Economic Analysis, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1989). 
111 See, e.g., Grant R. Garber, Noncompete Clauses: Employee Mobility, Innovation Ecosystems, and 
Multinational R&D Offshoring, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1079, 1102-07 (2013) (comparing restrictions 
on noncompete agreements in California, China, India, and Brazil); Max Planck Comments, supra note 
46, ¶ 15 (noting that this permits each country to protect employees as it sees fit); see also ¶ 32 
(suggesting this be made more explicit). 
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reverse engineering, it protects a worker’s ability to acquire information for 
bargaining purposes; it safeguards freedom of expression, including, in particular, 
freedom to reveal misdoing by the trade secret owner; and there is an open-ended 
provision allowing use “for the purpose of protecting a legitimate interest.”112  
As to remedies, TRIPS requires WTO members to “prevent” disclosure, 
acquisition, or use—which presumably means that judges must have the authority 
to enjoin these activities. However, the Agreement does not say how long the 
injunction must last (in contrast, the UTSA and DTSA require the award be 
reasonable and preclude the possibility of enjoining the defendant in perpetuity).  
113 A long-term injunction maximizes deterrence, but jurisdictions that are 
concerned about innovation, competition, and information flows could enjoin for 
shorter periods. For example until the information would have been made public, 
or they might dissolve the injunction when the information becomes public.114 
Jurisdictions are also free to differ on how they calculate monetary damages. The 
EU, for example, puts considerable emphasis on proportionate relief, but it 
provides only very general criteria for judges to use to make that determination. 115 
To sum up, despite considerable similarity in the basic contours of all 
trade secrecy laws—which reflects the influence of U.S. law on TRIPS and TRIPS 
on the rest of the WTO—there is nevertheless considerable scope for variation in 
outcome, reflecting different balances among competing policies. Jurisdictions 
that wish to offer trade secrecy as a less costly alternative to patents can define the 
subject matter of the law expansively, take a hard line on what is considered secret 
or readily accessible, and adopt a relaxed approach to the efforts required to 
maintain secrecy, to what constitutes misappropriation and infringement, and to 
who is considered an infringer. A jurisdiction that believes trade secrecy is an 
important component of innovation policy but is nonetheless concerned about 
information flows and the patent/trade secrecy balance can take actions, such as 
calibrating its view on accessibility, that increase the innovator’s risk that the 
information will be considered unprotectable. Jurisdictions concerned with 
protecting employees can limit the scope of protection to technical information, 
require explicit notice at the time an employee is hired or becomes exposed to 
sensitive information, refuse to adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine, and enact 
defenses protective of employment.  
Chinese trade secrecy law has served as an example of a highly nuanced 
approach. At least until its latest iteration, it has included a list of information that 
                                                 
112 EU Directive, supra note 32, art. 5.  
113 See UTSA, supra note 9, § 2(b); DTSA § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i). 
114 For the competing rules on the length of injunctions in the United States prior to the adoption of the 
UTSA, see Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 113 (2d Cir. 1949); 
Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104, 109, (7th Cir. 1936); and Winston Research 
Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 427 (9th Cir. 1965). See Christopher A. Cotropia, 
Post-Expiration Patent Injunctions, 7 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105 (1998). The EU Directive is vague 
on the issue, see Max Planck Comments, supra note 46, at ¶ 24. 
115 EU Directive, supra note 32, arts. 7 (1), 11, and 13. 
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cannot be regarded as nonpublic (including customs of the industry, information 
that can be observed from inspection, and information in the published literature). 
It appeared to require explicit confidentiality agreements and also specified when 
ex-employees can use their former employer’s customer lists. Most interesting is 
the treatment of tippee liability: the law included what is, in effect, a compulsory 
license—a provision that permits bona fide purchasers of information to continue 
to use that information upon payment of reasonable royalty to the owner of the 
trade secret.116 Under this approach, the owner of the trade secret recovers its 
investment, but a tippee (including, perhaps an employer who hires an employee 
who uses confidential information in his new position) can exploit that knowledge 




Part I demonstrated that as foreign countries implement their international 
obligations to enact trade secrecy protection, they take divergent approaches to 
key policy issues, including questions on how to foster inventive activity and 
protect creative investments. In addition, they differ in their views on the 
patent/trade secrecy trade off, ensuring the mobility of the workforce, and the 
importance of a robust public domain. U.S. courts can therefore no longer proceed 
as though there are no foreign interests at stake in trans-border trade secrecy cases. 
This Part analyzes the Supreme Court’s current approach to the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law, generally, and in the context of intellectual property 
litigation. The next Part takes up the question of applying the Court’s approach to 
section 337 exclusion actions and to the DTSA, and compares that to the approach 
traditionally used in state law claims. 
 
A. The Supreme Court’s General Approach to Extraterritorial Application of U.S. 
Statutes 
 
                                                 
116 For an account of Guangdong Taike Electronic Co. Ltd. v. Wang Xiaowei, where a Chinese 
appellate court affirmed a ruling that an employee could not be dismissed for taking trade secrets when 
the only evidence was in illegally monitored email, see Michael D. Stovsky, Allan Goldner, and 
Richard Grams, China’s Evolving Landscape for Trade Secret Protection, MONDAQ (June 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/318770/Trade+Secrets/Chinas+Evolving+Legal+Landscape+For+Trade+Se
cret+Protection.   
117 Xiong, supra note 33, at 256–58 & 266–67. Laws applicable to secrets in government hands 
displays similar nuance: laws primarily concerned with maintaining secrecy (for example, of military 
information) characterize appropriation as treason; laws aimed at balancing secrecy against important 
interests in access contain detailed safe harbors. Cf. Haiyan Liu, The Policy and Targets of Criminal 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China and the United States, 24 WASH. INT'L L.J. 137, 
151 (2015) (noting that China’s goals in enforcing criminal intellectual property laws are different from 
the goals of American enforcers). See generally Jerry Cohen, Federal Issues in Trade Secrecy Law, 2 J. 
HIGH TECH L. 1 (2003). 
22https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol8/iss2/4
287                          CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW                       [265:287]               
 
 
  The approach of the Supreme Court to the application of U.S. statutes in 
international cases has had a long and somewhat inconsistent history, reflected in 
both court opinions and the ALI’s successive revisions of the Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law. A presumption of territorial application based on the 
location of the conduct at issue was invoked by U.S. courts throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century and confirmed by the Supreme Court’s 
1909 decision in American Banana Company v. United Fruit Co.118 However, 
notions of extraterritoriality expanded, with the Supreme Court retreating from the 
conduct test of American Banana and embracing a broader view of territoriality 
that included effects within the United States of activity that occurred abroad. In a 
series of cases, the move to expand conduct to include the acts or the effects of the 
acts permitted a significantly broader reach for U.S. antitrust laws;119 that 
approach was reflected in the ALI’s first attempt to restate this law, the 
Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law.  It contained a provision entitled 
“Territorial Interpretation of United States Law,” stating:  
Rules of United States statutory law, whether prescribed by 
federal or state authority, apply only to conduct occurring within 
or having effect within the territory of the United States, unless 
the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute.120  
                                                 
118 213 U.S. 347 (1909).  
119 See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); United States v. 
Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 148 F.2d 416 (2d 
Cir. 1945).  
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 38 (Am. Law. 
Inst. 1965) (emphasis added).  
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But even with respect to statutes that were interpreted to have an 
extraterritorial reach, their application to foreign conduct was often restrained in 
light of foreign interests. Of particular significance was the Ninth Circuit’s 
invocation of a comity framework in the antitrust context in Timberlane Lumber v. 
Bank of American National Trust and Savings Ass’n,121 where the court identified 
a list of factors to consider in order to balance U.S. interests in regulating the 
activity in question against the interests of relevant foreign nations. That approach 
was later reflected in the second iteration of the Restatement, the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law. The Restatement (Third) did not include a 
statement about interpretation of statutes or a rule about extraterritorial 
application. Instead it identified a variety of legitimate bases for the exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction along with a provision stating that any assertion of 
prescriptive jurisdiction was nonetheless limited by a principle of 
“reasonableness” that required both U.S. and foreign interests to be considered.122 
“Reasonableness” in this context was to be understood not merely as the 
application of discretion, but rather as an obligation among states. 
Notwithstanding this limiting principle of reasonableness, the approach resulted in 
the broad extraterritorial application of a number of federal statutes.123 
In its 1990 decision in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. 
Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),124 the Supreme Court, in holding that the 
Civil Rights Act did not extend to conduct abroad, appeared to return to a 
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law. The Court emphasized 
the need to protect against unintended clashes between U.S. and foreign law in the 
absence of a clear intention by Congress to extend coverage “beyond places over 
which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative 
control.”125 Two years later, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,126 the 
Supreme Court did not invoke the presumption in a case brought by U.S. plaintiffs 
under the Sherman Act to conduct that took place abroad but with effects in the 
                                                 
121 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
122 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Am. Law Inst.1987), 
§403—Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe (“Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 
402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity 
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable”).  
123 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (stating that because the 
defendant could comply with both U.S. and British law, there was no conflict and the application of the 
U.S. antitrust laws was not unreasonable. In the securities area, the federal courts applied both a 
“conduct” and “effects” test to permit extraterritorial application of the U.S. securities laws. See, e.g., 
Leasco Data Process Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). For commentary on 
the securities cases, see Stephen Choi & Linda Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global 
Securities Class-Act Lawsuit, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465. 
124 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
125 Id. at 248 (internal citation omitted). 
126 509 U.S. 764 (1993); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1. 
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United States, and found that the U.S. interests justified the application of U.S. 
law.127 However, in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court applied the presumption 
to other statutes, including to suits brought under the Securities Exchange Act,128 
the Alien Tort Statute,129 and the Patent Act.130 Specifically, in Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd.,131 the Court explained the presumption analysis in 
the following way. First, that Congress intended statutes to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States because Congress is generally 
concerned only with domestic conditions, unless the statute indicates a broader 
reach. Second, that a court must then look to determine whether the particular 
statute does indeed have a domestic focus. In Morrison, the Supreme Court 
concluded that there was “no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § 
10(b) applies extraterritorially” and that the focus of the statute was the purchase 
or sale of securities, particularly those listed on a U.S. exchange.132 Accordingly, 
the Court concluded that the Securities Exchange Act did not apply to securities 
traded on a foreign exchange.  It therefore dismissed the case. 
                                                 
127 In Hartford, the Court found that "the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to 
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States." 509 U.S. at 796. 
Hartford’s effects test appeared to stand in considerable tension with Aramco, which seemed to 
embrace something akin to a “clear statement” rule. As noted in Justice Scalia’s partial dissent in 
Hartford, however, relevant precedent had long “found the presumption to be overcome  with respect to 
our antitrust laws.” Id. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The next antitrust case considered the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. § 6a, which addresses the geographic scope of 
the Sherman Act. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). Although it 
did not mention the presumption explicitly, the Court found “no significant indication that at the time 
Congress wrote this statute courts would have thought the Sherman Act applicable in these 
circumstances.” Id. at 169. Since Empagran, congressional intent has been the touchstone for 
determining whether the presumption has been overcome. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that a 
“clear indication” is necessary to overcome the presumption, which can be shown not just by a clear 
statement but from the relevant “context” as well. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 
247, 255 (2010) (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has 
none”). See also, id. at 2883 (“But we do not say. . . that the presumption against extraterritoriality is a 
clear statement rule. . . . Assuredly context can be consulted as well.”). In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. 
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016), the presumption was overcome with respect to the substantive 
provisions of RICO to the extent that the predicate crimes incorporated into the RICO violation 
themselves applied extraterritorially. Id. at 2102. However, the analysis of whether the presumption 
was overcome was a provision-by-provision analysis; thus, plaintiffs could not recover because the 
damages were suffered abroad but the presumption was not overcome with respect to the private right  
of action provision. Id. at 2106 (“Irrespective of any extraterritorial application of § 1962, we conclude 
that § 1964(c) does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.”). For a synopsis and 
critique of recent jurisprudence, see Aaron D. Simowitz, RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty. and the 
Reach of U.S. Law, 17 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 217 (2016/2017). 
128 Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
129 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). 
130 Microsoft Corp. v. AT &T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
131 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010). 
132 Id. at 266–67. 
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  In the 2015 Term, the Supreme Court took up the issue of extraterritorial 
application of a federal statute in the context of the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in its RJR Nabisco v. European Community 
decision.133 The European Community (EC, now the European Union (EU)) had 
alleged a cigarette smuggling scheme resulting in competitive harm to state-owned 
businesses, harm to European financial institutions, and lost tax revenue. Much 
like the amended EEA, RICO includes both criminal and civil remedies. As 
regards the substantive provisions of RICO,134 a unanimous Court determined that 
a number of the predicate acts required for a RICO violation were by their terms 
intended to apply to conduct occurring abroad, and to the extent that a RICO 
criminal complaint included such acts, the provisions could have extraterritorial 
application. However, with respect to a private plaintiff’s claims for damages, 
under a different section of the statute,135 a divided Court (4-3) held that a civil 
plaintiff must prove a domestic injury in order to establish liability. The Court 
explained that without the “check imposed by prosecutorial discretion . . . 
providing a private civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a potential for 
international friction beyond that presented by merely applying U.S. substantive 
law to that foreign conduct.”136 Accordingly, “clear direction from Congress is 
required.”137 The Court failed to find that direction in the civil provisions of the 
statute.138   
                                                 
133 136 S.Ct. 2090 (2016); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 901(a), 
84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006)). 
134 18 U.S.C. § 1962. 
135 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
136 Nabisco, 136 U.S. at 2107 (internal citation omitted). 
137 Id. at 2107.   
138 Section 1964 provides a damages action to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property” by a 
violation of § 1962. First, the Court reasoned that § 1964 was not co-extensive with § 1962, because the 
phrase “business or property” excluded some injuries, such as personal injuries. Then, the Court 
reasoned that the presumption must be applied to each provision, and rejected the Second Circuit (and 
the dissent’s) alternative view that § 1964’s extraterritorial effect “flows from” § 1962’s. Thus, finding 
no clear indication that the remedial provision applied extraterritorially, the Court held that it did not.  
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  Significantly, the invocation of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
in this new era of prescriptive jurisdiction does not end the inquiry with respect to 
the application of a federal statute. Rather, in the first step, where the presumption 
may be rebutted by congressional intent identified by language or clear purpose of 
the statute, the Court has identified prescriptive comity as a limitation to avoid 
unreasonable interference with the interests of other countries. For example, in F. 
Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A.,139 the Court held that application of 
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1962 (the FTAIA)140 to foreign 
anti-competitive conduct was nonetheless constrained by principles of prescriptive 
comity and thus would not extend to foreign plaintiffs who suffered independent 
foreign harm.   
 A recent decision of the Second Circuit, In Re Vitamin C Antitrust 
Litigation,141 illustrates how prescriptive comity operates as a limitation on the 
reach of the U.S. antitrust laws. In the Vitamin C case, U.S. purchasers of vitamin 
C brought an antitrust claim against Chinese defendants, alleging price fixing and 
supply manipulation of vitamin C exported from China. Although the presumption 
against extraterritoriality has generally been held not to limit application of U.S. 
antitrust statutes, the defendants argued that the case should be dismissed because 
they were acting at the express direction and mandate of the Chinese government.  
Indeed, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce filed an amicus brief in the district 
court confirming that the output levels and export price were regulated and 
approved by the Chinese Government. The district court refused to dismiss the 
action, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, stating that the 
case should be dismissed on comity grounds, referencing unique international 
concerns implicated by this type of regulatory action by a foreign government. 
      In situations where a statute is found not to have extraterritorial 
application, a further inquiry is required. As a second step, the question is whether 
the application of a particular provision of the statute is nonetheless considered 
domestic. This inquiry turns on the “focus” of the statute. If the focus is on activity 
(such as a particular act, injury, or an effect) that occurred in the United States, 
then the application of the statute is not regarded as extraterritorial and can be 
applied as a domestic application.  However, if the focus is on particular activity 
that takes place abroad, then it is an impermissible extraterritorial application. For 
example, in the context of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, the Supreme Court 
held in Morrison that the focus of Section 10(b)(5)—the object of the statute’s 
solicitude—was on conduct on an “exchange,” and because the purchases of 
securities were made on a foreign exchange, application of this provision of the 
Act was impermissibly extraterritorial.142   
                                                 
139 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
140 15 U.S.C. § 6a. 
141 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub. nom. Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome 
Pharm. Co., No. 16-1220, 2018 WL 386563 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018)(limited to the question of how much 
deference a U.S. court should give to a foreign government’s statement of its law). 
142 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
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Once again, a recent decision of the Second Circuit—now before the 
Supreme Court—illustrates this approach. In Microsoft v. United States,143 the 
court looked to the “focus” of the Stored Communication Act144 in order to 
determine whether a search warrant issued to Microsoft, the U.S.-based internet 
server, was impermissibly extraterritorial because the information was stored in 
Ireland. Accepting that there was no showing that the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of the statute had been rebutted, the court turned to the 
“focus of the statute.” The Court of Appeal concluded that the “focus” of the SCA 
was the privacy of the stored communication (which was in Ireland) and not the 
disclosure to the government (which would be made in the United States). Thus 
the court concluded that the warrant did not suffice as a domestic application of 
the statute. 
      This general framework is now reflected in the ALI’s current revision of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Restatement (Fourth). Section 203 
is entitled “Presumption Against Extraterritoriality” and provides: “U.S. courts 
interpret federal statutory provisions to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States unless there is clear indication of congressional intent to the 
contrary.”145 Comment c to section 203, titled “Focus of the statutory provision,” 
explains that if the presumption has not been rebutted, a court will look to the 
focus of the provision, to determine if the application of the provision would be 
domestic or extraterritorial.146 An additional section, section 204, titled 
“Reasonableness in Interpretation,” further provides that: “As a matter of 
prescriptive comity, a U.S. court may interpret federal statutory provisions to 
include other limitations on their applicability.” However, the Restatement 
(Fourth) insists that section 204 and the reasonableness prong are limited. This 
prong will not apply when Congress has made its intent to apply a particular 
provision clear, even if doing so would interfere with the sovereign authority of 
other states.”147 The Restatement (Fourth) states the principle that courts may 
avoid only “unreasonable” interference with the authority of other states, and 
“[i]nterference with the sovereign authority of a foreign state may be reasonable if 
such application would serve the legitimate interests of the United States.” Finally, 
this principle does not give courts discretion to decline to apply federal law, but 
rather serves as an approach to statutory interpretation.148 Thus it appears that the 
                                                 
143  Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E–Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, sub. nom. United States v. Microsoft, 
2017 WL 2869958 (October 16, 2017). 
144 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. 
145 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2017) [hereinafter the Restatement Fourth]. 
146 The Reporters’ Notes explain that different federal statutory provisions focus on different things. 
Some statutes focus on “proscribed conduct” whereas others focus on “transactions” and still others on 
“injury”. 
147 RESTATEMENT FOURTH, § 204, cmt. b. 
148 Id. at cmt. a. 
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Restatement (Fourth) resists any type of case-specific interest balancing.149  
Nonetheless, it is important to note that case law suggests that reasonableness may 
have a more robust role to play. 
 
B.     Extraterritoriality in the Context of Intellectual Property Cases 
 
  Applying these principles on extraterritoriality to intellectual property is 
complicated by the fact that the Supreme Court has, in these cases, sent somewhat 
mixed signals. As noted earlier, the presumption against extraterritorial application 
has been applied to patent cases, 150 including by lower courts in process patent 
cases.151  In Microsoft v. AT&T Corp.,152 the Supreme Court was asked to 
determine whether a provision of the Patent Act (section 271(f)(1))153 that deemed 
a supplier liable for patent infringement for actively inducing infringement by 
sending “a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention” abroad 
was applicable to Microsoft’s sending software on a master disk for reproduction 
outside the United States. Admonishing that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality “applies with particular force” in patent law, Justice Ginsburg 
stated: 
Foreign conduct is [generally] the domain of foreign law, and in 
the area here involved, in particular, foreign law may embody 
different policy judgments about the relative rights of inventors, 
competitors, and the public in patented inventions.154  
Thus, even though section 271(f) was expressly designed to deal with parties who 
evade U.S. patent rights by off-shoring the production of patented inventions,155 
the Court refused to extend U.S. patent law to hold Microsoft liable for infringing 
AT&T’s patented software.  The Court reasoned that software is not a 
“component” within the meaning of the statute.  Moreover, it noted that the 
software was reproduced abroad, not in the United States. 
                                                 
149 William S. Dodge, Jurisdiction in the Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, Yearbook of 
Private International Law (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972612 (“the Fourth 
Restatement concludes that state practice does not support a requirement of case-by-case balancing to 
establish reasonableness as a matter of international law.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
150 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
151  See, e.g., Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
152 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
153 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). 
154 550 U.S. at 454–55 (internal quotations omitted). 
155 The statute overruled Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 409 U.S. 902 (1972), which 
refused to apply the Patent Act when components were sent abroad for assembly there. See also §§ 
271(f)(2) and 271(g). 
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At the same time, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the rule for copyright is 
different. She deduced from the fact that Congress had, in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA),156 protected the encryption of digital content to prevent 
unlawful reproduction, that the legislature had recognized the need to use U.S. law 
to protect works from global piracy.157   
As to trademarks, we have seen that the Court in Steele v. Bulova 
seemingly took a rather expansive view of the reach of trademark law’s Lanham 
Act.158 It applied the statute to the activities of the defendant (Steele), who had 
lawfully purchased watch components from the United States and Switzerland and 
lawfully assembled them in Mexico, where the watches were lawfully stamped 
with the “Bulova” name, and sold.159 The Court recited the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, but held it was rebutted by the jurisdictional provision in the 
Lanham Act, which asserts Congress’s intent “to regulate commerce within the 
control of Congress.”160 It then held Steele’s conduct was unlawful under the 
Lanham Act.161 
These cases suggest that the type of intellectual property might matter to 
the extraterritoriality analysis. If so, the question is how trade secrets should be 
classified. On the one hand, one might view trade secrets as falling on the patent 
side of the line, where the Court in Microsoft v. AT&T found dispositive the 
absence of a pointed statement of congressional intent regarding the specific 
conduct at issue.162 As Part I suggested, foreign trade secrecy laws, like patent 
laws, embody different policy judgments about the relative rights of inventors, 
competitors, and the public.”163 In contrast, there is generally more international 
agreement on trademark and copyright laws.164 It is also possible that the Court 
understands patents as protecting intellectual contributions incorporated mainly in 
                                                 
156 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. 
157 550 U.S. at 458. 
158 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
159 Id. at 281-82. 
160 Id. at 283-284 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  As noted later, reliance on a jurisdictional provision 
relating to foreign commerce has not generally been sufficient to overcome the presumption. See infra 
notes 203–204.). 
161 Id. at 289. 
162 550 U.S. at 458.  
163 Id. 
164 The TRIPS Agreement, for example, incorporates the highly detailed Berne Convention by 
reference, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 9.1, and adds considerably to the Paris Convention’s 
substantive rules on trademark protection, Paris Convention, supra note 21, arts. 15–21. By contrast, 
the TRIPS Agreement is the first multinational agreement to impose minimum standards of substantive 
protection for patents and trade secrets; the trade secrecy section contains few details.  
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tangible materials, which are usually difficult to manufacture and transport across 
borders, but sees trademark and copyright law as protecting information (the 
cognitive impact of marks; the works embodied in digitized books, films, and 
recordings) that are readily reproduced and can be instantaneously distributed 
globally.165 Because the risk of infringement abroad is so much greater in the latter 
cases, it may be that the Court is more willing to find extraterritorial intent in the 
copyright and trademark context. Technological trade secrets tend to be embodied 
in goods; in this respect, they are similar to patents. On the other hand, trade 
secrets are, in essence, information. As the Introduction suggests, modern business 
practices and technological developments have increased the risk that trade secrets 
(that is, secret information) will be transferred around the world, taken without 
authorization, and exploited in multiple markets. Once known outside of the 
putative trade secret owner’s business, the value of the information is significantly 
diminished. Thus, although the risk of infringement may not be as great as in 
copyright or trademark cases, the injury suffered is likely to be more severe. In 
that sense, perhaps trade secrecy statutes should be treated more like copyright and 
trademark measures for purposes of the extraterritoriality analysis.   
Factors other than the nature of the intellectual property right in question 
may also explain why the outcome in Steele v. Bulova is quite different from the 
result in Microsoft v. AT& T. Perhaps it is not the language in the jurisdictional 
grant in Bulova that necessarily led the Court to approve the extraterritorial reach. 
In addition to the reference to the “broad [prescriptive] jurisdictional grant,” the 
Court in Bulova listed a set of facts justifying application of the statute in the 
particular case.166 Some of the defendant’s infringing watches had “filtered” into 
the United States. U.S. consumers in the border area attributed problems with the 
watches to the U.S firm; accordingly, there were potential adverse effects on the 
Bulova brand.167 In addition, the defendant was a U.S. citizen; parts had been 
purchased in the United States; and because the defendant’s Mexican trademark 
had been cancelled prior to Supreme Court consideration of the case, the 
possibility of conflict with foreign law had been eliminated.168 
                                                 
165 Indeed, the copyright cases Justice Ginsburg was likely considering all involved an unauthorized 
reproduction (called a “predicate act” or a “root copy”) that occurred in the United States, prior to 
further reproduction abroad. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/territorial Rights: Private 
International Law Questions of the Global Information Infrastructure, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 
318, 335 (1995) (“In the U.S., some courts have simplified the choice of law problem by applying U.S. 
law to the entirety of a multinational infringement claim, when the root act of copying occurred in the 
U.S.”), comparing Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (1994) with 
Update Art v. Modiin Publishers, 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988). By contrast, the software at issue in 
Microsoft was reproduced abroad. In this respect, claims regarding trade secrets misappropriated 
abroad come closer to the claim asserted by AT&T than to the claims in the root copy cases. 
166 344 U.S. at 284. 
167 Id. at 285. 
168 Id. at 285-288. 
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It is uncertain which of the many factors cited in Bulova were considered 
determinative by the Court.169 In the heavily cited case, Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. 
T. Eaton Co.,170 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distilled the Bulova 
factors into a three-part framework that considered: (1) whether the defendant is a 
U.S. citizen; (2) whether the conduct has a substantial effect on U.S. commerce; 
and (3) the prospect of a conflict with foreign laws.171 In subsequent lower court 
cases, courts differed as to the relative importance of particular factors,172 as well 
as their precise formulation.173 However, recent decisions take a different tack: 
they find the Lanham Act to have extraterritorial effect, but then place 
considerable emphasis on concerns of comity in determining the Act’s reach.174 
For example, in Trader Joe’s v. Hallatt,175 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals invoked its earlier Timberlane comity framework to justify application of 
the Lanham Act to reach a Canadian vendor. In that case, the defendant Hallatt 
operated a store in Vancouver, Canada, where he sold authentic Trader Joe’s 
products albeit at inflated prices, using, without authorization, marks that were 
potentially confusingly similar to those of Trader Joe’s.176 When Trader Joe’s 
subsequently refused to sell its products to him, Hallatt donned disguises to buy 
from the stores and also hired agents to make bulk purchases for him.177 Trader 
Joe’s sued under the Lanham Act, and the Ninth Circuit, applying the Timberlane 
factors, held that the Lanham Act applied extraterritorially because there were 
effects on American commerce, a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs under the Act, 
and the interests of and links to American commerce were sufficiently strong in 
relation to those of the foreign nation.178 Although the infringing goods did not 
                                                 
169 See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 505, 528 (1997) (“[T]he [Bulova] Court did not explain which of the facts of the case, if any, 
were essential to liability or how such facts were to be weighed”). 
170 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956). 
171 Id. at 642. 
172  See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 121 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[W]e first ask whether the 
defendant is an American citizen, and if he is not, then we use the substantial effects test as the sole 
touchstone to determine jurisdiction.”). 
173 See, e.g., Nintendo of Am., Ltd. v. Aero Power Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250–51 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring 
a “significant effect” rather than a “substantial effect” on United States commerce). 
174 See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764); cf. Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 707 (4th Cir. 
2016) (emphasizing injury in the United States as a prerequisite to false advertising claim involving 
foreign mark).  See generally, Dinwoodie, supra note 36.   
175 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016). 
176 Id. at 964-65. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 975. 
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flow back into the United States, as they did in the Bulova case, the court 
nonetheless found that the reputational harm suffered by Trader Joe’s created the 
necessary effect on U.S. commerce. In addition, the court emphasized that the 
defendant had lawful permanent status in the United States (thereby “subject[ing] 
himself to the laws of [the United States]”179), and engaged in commercial activity 
in the United States as part of his infringing scheme. Accordingly, the defendant’s 
actions involved some domestic (as well as foreign) conduct.180   
In assessing the U.S. and foreign interests – the comity factors – the court 
did not find reason to limit the application of the Lanham Act.181 There was no 
pending adversarial proceedings between Trader Joe’s and Hallatt in Canada and 
because Hallat had permanent resident status, orders made by the court (damages 
and an injunction) were easily enforceable; Trader Joe’s U.S. trademarks were 
affected; and an essential, albeit small, part of defendant’s conduct took place in 
the United States.182 
 
IV. THE TRADE SECRET CASES 
 
         Since the Supreme Court appears to distinguish among intellectual property 
rights, and in view of the significant policy difference between trademark and 
trade secrecy law, the Lanham Act extraterritoriality cases are not a perfect 
analogy for trade secrecy cases. Nonetheless, the factors developed in the 
aftermath of Bulova suggest the importance of context in determining the 
extraterritorial reach of federal statutes. Thus, they inform the application of the 
Supreme Court’s current two-step approach in analyzing section 337 actions, the 
DTSA, and state law.  We look at each statutory scheme in turn, and then 
reconsider federal law in light of state law experience. 
 
A. Section 337 Exclusion Orders 
 
The Tariff Act of 1930 gives the International Trade Commission (ITC), 
a quasi-judicial federal agency with roots in the Tariff Commission of 1916, 
authority to exclude from the United States goods made abroad unlawfully.  
Section 337 of the Tariff Act defines “unlawful” conduct to include “unfair 
methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles . . . into the 
United States.”183 Section 337 complaints are brought by private individuals and 
adjudicated by the ITC, which in recent years, has become an increasingly 
                                                 
179 Id. at 973. 
180 Id. 
181 Trader Joe’s, 835 F.3d at 975. 
182 Id. at 973-75. 
183 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A). 
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important venue for protecting trade secrets.184 The ITC has consistently construed 
section 337(a)(1)(A) to reach trade secret misappropriation,185 an interpretation 
that is supported by the Federal Circuit’s view that the statute gives the ITC 
“broad authority to address every type and form of unfair trade practice.”186  Upon 
finding a violation of section 337, the ITC “shall direct that the articles concerned . 
. . be excluded from entry into the United States” subject to limited exceptions on 
public interest grounds.187  The resulting nationwide exclusion order is reviewable 
by the President, who may “disapprove[]” the ITC’s determination for policy 
reasons, with the result that the exclusion order thereafter “ha[s] no force or 
effect.”188 
 Although the ITC has apparently excluded goods based on trade secret 
misappropriations occurring abroad for some time,189 the question of the 
extraterritorial reach of section 337 first came before the Federal Circuit in 
TianRui Group Co. Ltd. v. International Trade Commission.190 In TianRui, 
Amsted—a U.S. railway wheel manufacturer—had developed multiple secret 
processes for manufacturing cast steel railway wheels.191 A Chinese firm 
(TianRui) acquired the secret wheel-making technology by poaching employees 
from one of Amsted’s licensees in China after its own negotiations with Amsted 
over licensing terms broke down. TianRui used the information thus acquired to 
manufacture wheels in China, which it then sought to distribute in the United 
                                                 
184 For an overview of the relevant history and the procedure at the ITC, see Elizabeth A. Rowe & 
Daniel M. Mahfood, Trade Secrets, Trade, and Extraterritoriality, 66 ALA. L. REV. 63, 83–87 (2014). 
See also 19 C.F.R. § 210 (2012). See also Warren S. Heit and James P. Gagen, Litigating Trade 
Secrecy Misappropriation at the ITC, LAW 360 (May 24, 2016), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/795109/litigating-trade-secret-misappropriation-at-the-itc. 
185 See, e.g., Certain Processes for the Manufacture of Skinless Sausage Casings & Resulting Prods., 
Inv. No. 337–TA–148/169, USITC Pub. 1624 (Dec. 1984), 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/337/pub1624.pdf; Certain Apparatus for the Continuous Production 
of Copper Rod, Inv. No. 337–TA–52, USITC Pub. 1017 (Nov. 1979), 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/337/pub1017.pdf. 
186 Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 796 F.3d 1338, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 
444 (C.C.P.A. 1955)).  
187 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1). The public interest analysis requires, “considering the effect of such 
exclusion upon the public health and welfare” and various market-related factors. Id. 
188 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2). 
189 See, e.g., Certain Processes for the Manufacture of Skinless Sausage Casings & Resulting Prods., 
Inv. No. 337-TA-148, 11 (“the principals of [the respondent] Viscofan approached employees of 
Viscora [the French subsidiary of the U.S. firm, Union Carbide] and its subcontractors, and with their 
assistance, removed technical drawings, specifications, and pieces of equipment from Viscora's plant, 
which were copied, and served as the basis on which Viscofan's manufacturing operations were 
developed”).  
190 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
191 Id. at 1324. 
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States.192 Amsted filed a complaint with the ITC seeking an exclusion order for a 
violation of section 337. The ITC assigned the dispute to an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) who conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued a recommended 
determination.193 With the DTSA not yet enacted, the ALJ looked to the law of the 
state where Amsted was headquartered—Illinois—on the question of whether 
trade secret misappropriation had occurred.194 As for the question of the 
prescriptive reach of section 337, the ALJ rejected TianRui’s argument that the 
application of the statute was limited to misappropriation in the United States and 
emphasized the statute’s focus on “the nexus between the imported articles and the 
unfair methods of competition.”195  
       On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected the application of Illinois law to 
determine whether the activity was unfair, instead finding the question of what 
conduct constitutes “unfair methods of competition and unfair acts” to be one of 
federal law, as reflected in, for example, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition and the UTSA.196 As to the reach of the statute, the Federal Circuit 
undertook an extended discussion of extraterritoriality, addressing both the 
presumption as applied to this statute and the question whether the exclusion order 
operated as a domestic or extraterritorial application.197 In a somewhat blurred 
analysis of the two issues, the court held that the section 337 exclusion order was 
not an improper extraterritorial application.198   
                                                 
192 Id. at 1324–25. 
193 When the ITC receives a complaint, it first decides whether to investigate by vote of the 
Commissioners. If the investigation proceeds, the ITC assigns the dispute to an ALJ who conducts a 
hearing that culminates in the issuance of an “recommended determination.” See 19 C.F.R. 210(b) 
(2012). The ITC may subsequently review the ALJ’s recommendation and reaches a final 
determination as to whether there is a violation of section 337. Upon finding a violation of section 337, 
the ITC “shall direct that the articles concerned . . . be excluded from entry into the United States” 
subject to various public interest considerations. 
194 TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1325. 
195 Id. at 1325.  
196 Id. at 1327–1328. 
197 Id. at 1326-27. 
198 Id. at 1337. 
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A case can be made either that the language of the statute supports an 
extraterritorial application of section 337 or that the facts of TianRui constitute a 
domestic application of the statute; however, the Federal Circuit’s opinion does 
not make the most convincing case for either position.199 Thus, the Federal Circuit 
identified several reasons why the presumption against extraterritoriality “does not 
govern” the case at hand.200 First, in finding that section 337 applies 
extraterritorially, the Federal Circuit effectively grounded its entire analysis on the 
fact that section 337(a)(1)(A)’s phrase “in the importation of articles” indicates 
that the law targets “an inherently international transaction—importation.”201 The 
primary inference it drew from the transnational nature of importation was that 
Congress did not “ha[ve] only ‘domestic concerns in mind.’”202 To the extent that 
the Federal Circuit understood importation to imply foreign commerce, its analysis 
would be incomplete, in that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that even 
statutes that . . . expressly refer to foreign commerce do not apply abroad.”203 In 
fact, the case the Federal Circuit cited, Pasquantino v. United States,204 drew the 
opposite conclusion from similar language. However, the Federal Circuit may 
have understood importation as a reference to extraterritorial scope.205 But because 
                                                 
199 For what is in our view a better account favoring section 337’s extraterritorial reach, see notes infra 
notes 239-240 and accompanying text. For the argument that TianRui could be said to represent a 
domestic application, see text accompanying note 241 infra.  
200 TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1329. This analysis will address the first two reasons. The third reason related 
to legislative history, and is less important for present purposes. 
 
201 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
202 Id., citing Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371–72 (2005). The irony of citing 
Pasquantino is that although the Court in Pasquantino did say “this is surely not a statute in which 
Congress had only domestic concerns in mind,” the Court explicitly did not find that the wire fraud 
statute applied extraterritorially. See id. at 371 ([O]ur interpretation of the wire fraud statute does not 
give it “extraterritorial effect.”). At that time Pasquantino was decided, there was not yet a clearly 
delineated two-step inquiry associated with the presumption against extraterritoriality. Thus, as the 
court considered whether it was appropriate to apply the statute to activities that encompassed some 
domestic and some foreign conduct, it found it relevant to note that Congress had in mind, border-
spanning schemes. However, it is a clear misreading of Pasquantino to invoke it for the principle that 
congressional cognizance of border-spanning schemes constitutes a clear intent for a law to apply 
extraterritorially. 
203 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 262-3 (2010) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian 
American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 251 (1991)). 
204 544 U.S. at 372. 
205 661 F.3d at 1329. The Federal Circuit did emphasize that section 337 was similar to immigration 
statutes that permit barring the entry of non-citizens who make false statements to obtain entry to the 
United States (thereby arguably considering foreign conduct). However, the analogy probably does not 
survive recent Supreme Court precedent. In Nabisco, the Court flatly rejected an argument that the 
extraterritorial reach of RICO should be interpreted in the same fashion as that of the Clayton Act 
because RICO was modeled after the Clayton Act, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 
2090, 2109 (2016).  
36https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol8/iss2/4
301                          CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW                       [265:301]               
 
 
it did not offer any support for that view, it failed to identify the “clear indication” 
of extraterritorial application as required by Morrison just one year earlier.206   
A case for the extraterritorial application of section 337 can be made 
more persuasively. Nabisco emphasized that context is an important factor in 
determining whether a statute has a “clear indication” of extraterritorial 
application.207 There, context was “dispositive”: although Congress had “not 
expressly said that section 1962(c) applies to patterns of racketeering activity in 
foreign countries,” the fact that racketeering activity was defined to include 
predicate acts that do apply abroad was sufficient.208 Although RICO—as the 
Court noted—has a “unique structure,” the point about context is a more general 
one.209 To the extent that the context of section 337 actions includes actions related 
to imported articles, which almost by definition have had a trade secret 
incorporated abroad, the Federal Circuit could have taken up Morrison’s invitation 
to consult context.  
Further strengthening the case for the result—if not the reasoning—in 
TianRui is the fact that actions before the ITC differ in important ways from the 
civil actions the Supreme Court has considered in other types of cases. Although 
section 337 proceedings are initiated by private parties bringing complaints, the 
ITC is itself an Article I tribunal that exercises more control over the proceeding 
than an Article III court.210 The limited remedy (exclusion), along with these 
procedural differences, would seem to lower the bar for finding congressional 
intent that the statute applies extraterritorially, at least to some extent.211 In light of 
that limited remedy, the argument that a statute targeting unfairness “in the 
importation of articles”212 begins to present a stronger case for its extraterritorial 
application. But the reason is not because the statute “refers” to transnational 
conduct. Rather, congressional intent regarding section 337(a)(1)(A)’s geographic 
                                                 
206 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (“[U]nless there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly 
expressed to give a statute extraterritorial effect, we must presume it is primarily concerned with 
domestic conditions. When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has 
none.”). 
207 Nabisco, 136 S.Ct. at 2102–03.  
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 2103. 
210 Elizabeth A. Rowe & Daniel M. Mahfood, Trade Secrets, Trade, and Extraterritoriality, 66 ALA. L. 
REV. 63, 92 (2014) (describing ITC procedures following receipt of a complaint, which include voting 
on whether to commence an investigation, conducting its own investigation following the evidentiary 
hearings that take place under the supervision of an ALJ).  
211 Cf. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010) (“The probability of 
incompatibility with the applicable laws of other countries is so obvious that if Congress intended such 
foreign application ‘it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and 
procedures.’”) (citation omitted).   
212 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A). 
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scope begins to resemble the Court’s analysis in Bulova:213 acts abroad that would 
otherwise be lawful (because they are beyond the reach of U.S. law) become 
unlawful (i.e., may be reached by U.S. law) when they are part of a scheme that 
involves importation into the United States.214 Such a construction of 
congressional intent—unlike one that places great weight on “references” to 
foreign commerce—is not plainly in tension with the Court’s “presumption against 
extraterritoriality” doctrine.  
When one further considers that the President may veto ITC 
determinations for incompatibility with foreign relations or trade policy,215 the 
extraterritorial application of section 337 seems basically consistent with modern 
Supreme Court jurisprudence; it is, in effect, similar to Nabisco, where the civil 
and criminal provisions were distinguished in part on the basis of the prosecutorial 
discretion present in the criminal context. Similarly, the limitation in section 337  
to situations in which there is a domestic injury further reflects comity concerns. 
In short, the extraterritorial reach of section 337 is supported by: (1) the 
geographically limited remedy of exclusion; (2) the fact that importation takes 
place in the context of transnational commerce; (3) presidential review, 
traditionally exercised to safeguard foreign or economic policy concerns, is 
available; and (4) the requirement of a domestic injury. 
However, this interpretation of section 337 is not without its own 
contradictions.  Section 337(a)(1)(B)—a provision in the same statute that was 
explicitly adopted to provide extraterritorial reach to one specific situation—
indicates that Congress knows how to draft a measure to achieve an extraterritorial 
effect. That provision covers “importation into the United States . . . of articles” 
that are made “by means of [] a process covered by the claims of a valid and 
enforceable United States patent.”216 The language in that provision was modified 
after the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals (CCPA), held in In re Amtorg that section 337 could not be used to 
exclude from importation products made abroad by a process patented in the 
United States (a scenario very similar to the question whether to exclude a product 
made abroad with information that would have been unlawful to appropriate in the 
United States).217 The language at issue in Amtorg was in relevant respects 
                                                 
213 See supra note 166-174 and accompanying text. 
214 It is, of course, an independent question whether the foreign acts in question might constitute 
unlawful conduct under the laws of the state where they occurred. 
215 See 19 U.S.C. 1337(j)(2) (“If. . . the President, for policy reasons, disapproves such determination 
and notifies the Commission of his disapproval, then, effective on the date of such notice, such 
determination and the [remedial] action . . . with respect thereto shall have no force or effect.”). The 
President’s appeal power is controversial, both as to what is meant by “policy reasons” and from a 
normative perspective, see Nicolaas T. Bressers, Comment, A Presidential Remedy Under 
Administrative Control: Why Section 337(j) Should be Repealed, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 99, 
117 (2015) (noting that the authority is considered broad in scope).   
216 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B). 
217 In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1935). 
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identical to that in section 337(a)(1)(A) today: “unfair methods of competition and 
unfair acts in the importation of articles.”218 Congress thereafter enacted what is 
now section 337(a)(1)(B)(ii) because “owners of American process patent[s] are 
helpless to prevent the infringement abroad of their patent rights.”219 The new 
language necessarily indicates the provision has extraterritorial reach because 
articles imported into the United States are “made” outside the United States.  
Thus, section 337(a)(1)(B)(ii) contains—both textually and as a matter of 
legislative history—a clear indication of extraterritorial application, and would 
meet Morrison’s standard.220 By contrast, section 337(a)(1)(A) was not amended. 
Thus, it is not evident that the Morrison “clear indication” standard has been 
met.221 While reading section 337(a)(1)(A) to have only domestic application is 
difficult to square with the language of “all unfair methods” or “unfair acts in the 
importation of articles,” it could be interpreted as envisioning exclusion only when 
a trade secret is taken without authority from the United States for use in 
manufacturing abroad items destined for the U.S. market.222    
There was, however, a second reason why the TianRui court found that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality “d[id] not govern” the case.223 The court 
held the presumption posed no obstacle because it found the ITC had not applied 
section 337 to “purely extraterritorial conduct,” given that there was importation 
into the United States and domestic injury.224 The court initially asserted that 
“importation and the resulting domestic injury” constitutes “the statute’s focus,” 
suggesting that it considered the case to represent a domestic application of section 
337.225 However, the ensuing discussion revealed confusion about how the “focus” 
inquiry operates in the context of the presumption against extraterritoriality. First, 
the court described Morrison as “focusing the extraterritoriality analysis on the 
                                                 
218 The majority and the dissent in TianRui disagreed about the extent to which Amtorg reflected unique 
historical factors. However, somewhat oddly, the majority noted that the decision by Congress to 
amend the language at issue in Amtorg supported the result it reached in the case—despite the fact that 
the language found in Amtorg to be insufficient to support extraterritorial application continues to exist 
in the contemporary version of section 337(a)(1)(A). See TianRui Group Co. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
219 See H.R. REP. NO. 76-1781, 3d Sess. 4 (1940). 
220 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
221 See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), which creates infringement liability when products made abroad by 
processes patented in the United States are sold, offered for sale, or imported into the U.S. market.  
222 Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Lopez, 948 F.Supp. 684 (E.D.Mich. 1996) (secret information taken 
from General Motors in the United States for use by its rival, Volkswagen, in its German facility, for 
use in the United States in competition with GM).  
223 TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1329. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
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‘objects of the statute’s solicitude’.”226 Of course, this is only true in a limited 
way: as Morrison makes clear, the effort to identify the “objects of the statute’s 
solicitude” only becomes relevant at the second step, after it is determined that the 
law in question does not apply extraterritorially. At that point, the “objects of the 
statute’s solicitude” (i.e., the focus) must be identified in order to classify the 
proposed application as either domestic or (impermissibly) extraterritorial.227 
Thus, it is only correct to say that the analysis of extraterritoriality focuses on the 
“objects of the statute’s solicitude” if it was already determined that the statute 
lacks extraterritorial application. Yet in the very next sentence, after characterizing 
Morrison in this fashion, the court concluded, “the presumption against 
extraterritorial application does not apply” because the foreign conduct simply 
establishes one “element of a claim alleging a domestic injury and seeking a 
wholly domestic remedy.”228 The Federal Circuit thus blurred the analytically 
distinct inquiries into: (1) whether the presumption applies to the statute; (2) 
whether the presumption has been rebutted; and (3) what the focus of the statute is 
(and whether, in light of the focus, a given application is domestic or 
extraterritorial).  
The lack of clarity in the analysis renders it difficult to discern what 
limiting principle would cabin the majority’s application of section 337, as Judge 
Moore observed in a vigorous dissent: 
The issue is whether § 337 authorizes the Commission to apply 
domestic trade secret laws to conduct which entirely occurs in a 
foreign country . . . . The potential breadth of this holding is 
staggering. Suppose that goods were produced by workers who 
operate under conditions which would not meet with United 
States labor laws or workers who were not paid minimum wage 
or not paid at all—certainly United States industry would be hurt 
by the importation of goods which can be manufactured at a 
fraction of the cost abroad because of cheaper or forced labor. 
Would we consider these business practices unfair? Absent clear 
intent by Congress to apply the law in an extraterritorial manner, 
I simply do not believe that we have the right to determine what 
business practices, conducted entirely abroad, are unfair.229  
                                                 
226 Id. 
227 As Morrison notes, “it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact 
with the territory of the United States.” Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266. 
228 TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1329. 
229 Id. at 1337–38 (Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & 
ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 318-19 (2d ed. 1999) (“Conceptually, 
Section 337 can be considered . . . a means of extraterritorial enforcement of domestic American 
intellectual property.”). 
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The majority responded that it was not interpreting section 337 to “police 
Chinese business practices,” but simply recognizing that the statute “sets the 
conditions under which products may be imported into the United States.”230 But it 
is not entirely accurate to say that an exclusion order does not “police Chinese 
business practices.” Because the U.S. market is very large, closing it to imports 
can have a significant effect on foreign producers. In some cases, the loss of 
potential revenue may be large enough to make continued global operations 
uneconomical.231 To avoid the threat of a section 337 action, foreign producers 
may well choose to guide their activity by the dictates of U.S. law rather than the 
law of the country in which they operate. Given the policy bases for differences 
among national trade secrecy laws, exclusion could arguably produce exactly the 
sort of clash that has concerned the Supreme Court in other contexts. 
The prospect of regulatory overreach was presented in an even sharper 
fashion in a recent section 337(a)(1)(A) case in which Chinese courts had already 
adjudicated the trade secret misappropriation claim, and had absolved the 
defendant (the respondent in the section 337 action) of liability. Sino Legend v. 
Int’l Trade Commission232 concerned a New York-based chemical manufacturer 
(SI Group) that brought a section 337 claim against a Chinese company, Sino 
Legend, for trade secret misappropriation. The secrets in question related to 
processes for producing a resin used in the production of synthetic rubber tires 
containing multiple layers; they were transferred by the complainant, SI Group, a 
New York corporation, to China under a confidentiality agreement expressly 
governed by New York law.233 Sino Legend allegedly poached employees from a 
Chinese subsidiary of SI Group, who worked with Sino Legend to take and use SI 
Group’s trade secrets.234 As in TianRui, all the essential conduct constituting 
misappropriation occurred abroad. Nonetheless, the ITC determined that it was 
bound by TianRui, and consequently issued a limited exclusion remedy for a 
period of ten years. In the subsequent appeal, the judges at oral argument framed 
the case as a referendum on TianRui.235 Two days after the oral argument, the 
                                                 
230 Id. at 1330. 
231 Cf. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Industries, Inc. 894 F.Supp.2d 691 (E.D. Va. 2012) 
(enjoining production of Kevlar vests in response to a misappropriation claim under state law). 
232 623 Fed.Appx. 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Sino Legend (Zhangjiagang) Chem. Co. 
v. Int'l Trade Comm'n (9 Jan. 2017). 
233 Initial Determination, Certain Rubber Resins and Processes for Mfg. Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-849, 
2013 WL 4495127, at *7 (USITC June 17, 2013).  
234 Id. at *52. 
235 Oral Argument at 1:42, Sino Legend v. ITC, 623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Are you asking 
us to overrule TianRui?”); id. at 6:16 (“So where that leaves you is an argument as to whether TianRui 
was correct or not.”); id. at 6:48 (“It seems to me that most of the briefing and most of the argument is 
based on TianRui, that it was wrong, it was wrongly decided.”). 
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Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the ITC’s determination without an opinion.236  
Despite framing the appeal as an attempt to re-open legal questions 
settled in TianRui, important factual differences distinguished the two cases. In 
TianRui, the court discussed at some length whether there was any tension 
between Chinese and U.S. law, ultimately concluding that it “could not discern 
any relevant difference” on the record below.237 By contrast, in Sino Legend, SI 
Group had brought multiple actions in China over a period of four years regarding 
the alleged misappropriation, all of which were unsuccessful. The Chinese Trade 
Remedy and Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce (TRB) filed two 
amicus briefs—one in support of rehearing en banc at the Federal Circuit, and 
another in support of the subsequent certiorari petition once the petition for 
rehearing was denied. In the former, the TRB elaborated:  
[T]he ITC does not have jurisdiction over conduct that occurs 
entirely in China, especially . . . where the very same issues have 
been resolved by China’s competent courts. The TRB expresses 
its disappointment and displeasure with this aspect of the 
adjudication to date. It is also the TRB’s view that the 
astonishing ruling in this case—that the decisions of Chinese 
courts on the identical issue between the same parties are totally 
irrelevant and, therefore, can simply be ignored by the ITC—
frustrates the respect properly due to the judicial sovereignty of 
any nation and treaty partner.238 
 
Thus, the summary affirmance without opinion might suggest that the comity (or 
“sovereignty”) concerns discussed in the TRB brief were wholly without 
significance in the eyes of the Federal Circuit.   
However, even when comity concerns are taken into account, the results 
in TianRui and Sino Legend can be supported. The application of section 337 to 
foreign conduct can be justified on the basis of the nexus created by importation 
into the United States and the development of the trade secrets in the United 
States.  Even in Sino Legend, exclusion is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
Chinese judgments absolving the ITC respondent of liability. Section 337 is a 
limited remedy; it is not a civil action for a trade secrecy violation, does not 
provide for an injunction or damages, and protects only the U.S. market.239 
Moreover, as cases such as Empagran, Vitamin C, and the 50 years of trademark 
                                                 
236 Under Fed. Cir. R. 36, a case that will have no precedential value (in this case, likely because it was 
taken to be effectively identical to TianRui) may be decided without opinion. 
237 TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1333. 
238 Amicus Curiae Brief of the Trade Remedy and Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce 
of The People’s Republic of China In Support of Rehearing En-Banc at 1-2, Sino Legend 
(Zhangjiagang) Chem. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 623 Fed.Appx. 1016 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2016). 
239 Cf.  Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 746 (2d Cir. 1994) (“While the stringent Vanity 
Fair test is appropriate when the plaintiff seeks an absolute bar against a corporation's use of its mark 
outside our borders, that test is unnecessarily demanding when the plaintiff seeks the more modest goal 
of limiting foreign uses that reach the United States.”).  
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cases following Bulova indicate, prescriptive comity may still operate in a 
particular case as a limitation on the application of a statute with extraterritorial 
application.240 That said, the decision would have been more persuasive if the 
Federal Circuit had not relied on the TianRui’s assumption of no “conflict between 
the principles of misappropriation that the Commission applied and Chinese trade 
secret law”241 and instead engaged in a comity analysis that took the Chinese 
judgments into account and inquired whether the threat of section 337 exclusion 
orders would affect conduct in China and interfere with Chinese policy regarding 
employee mobility and the tippee’s expectations. 
We have offered an analysis of extraterritorial reach in TianRui and Sino 
Legend that attempts to reconcile the decision with recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and concerns of comity like the ones implicitly raised by Judge 
Moore and squarely presented in Sino Legend.242 As we demonstrated, the cases 
can be reconciled with the step-one presumption against extraterritoriality by 
interpreting section 337(a)(1)(A) as evincing congressional intent to reach foreign 
conduct. However, that interpretation sits uneasily with the express language of 
other parts of the statute. Thus, we believe that the court was on firmer ground 
when it moved to the second step – an interpretation of section 337 that 
emphasized its “focus.” It should, in our view, have reasoned that when section 
337(a)(1)(A) is invoked to exclude goods embodying misappropriated trade 
secrets that causes injury, the focus of the statute—the “object of its solicitude”—
                                                 
240 Cf. Elizabeth A. Rowe & Daniel M. Mahfood, Trade Secrets, Trade, and Extraterritoriality, 66 
ALA. L. REV. 63, 92 (2014) (“TianRui's reasoning does not foreclose the possibility that extraterritorial 
application of section 337 could be upheld based solely on the court's first reason—i.e., the 
jurisdictional nexus to the United States of attempted importation.”). Vitamin C, however, is a 
somewhat unusual case. The Second Circuit framed the question as one of whether U.S. courts should 
“abstain from exercising jurisdiction,” 837 F.3d at 179, despite the fact that the doctrine of international 
comity-based abstention only applies while parallel proceedings are pending abroad. Second, the court 
used an interest-balancing approach associated with Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 
F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), when arguably the case should have been analyzed under the rubric of foreign 
compulsion because the defendants argued the violations were compelled as a matter of foreign law. 
For a discussion of this question, see William S. Dodge, What’s the Right Comity Tool in Vitamin C?, 
Opinio Juris (27 Sept. 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/09/27/whats-the-right-comity-tool-in-vitamin-
c/. 
241 TianRui, 661 F.3d, at 1332.  Since TianRui, there has been an increase in ITC trade secrecy cases, 
Tamlin Bason, Post-TianRui Uptick in Trade Secret Disputes at the ITC Noticeable, but Slower Than 
Expected, BNA, Intellectual Property Resource Center (April 2015),  
http://iplaw.bna.com/iprc/display/alpha.adp?mode=topics&letter=T&frag_id=67115669&item=15934
&prod=ptdm.  See, e.g., In the Matter of Certain Stainless Steel Products, Certain Processes for Mfg. or 
Relating to Same, & Certain Products Containing Same Notice of the Commission’s Final 
Determination Finding A Violation of Section 337; Issuance of A Ltd. Exclusion Order & Cease & 
Desist Order; Termination of the Investigation, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-933 (May 25, 2016) 
(excluding products made using a secret method of manufacturing stainless steel stolen in Italy and 
used in Germany on the theory it interfered with the U.S. business of the Italian firm’s U.S. 
subsidiary—the defendants were convicted of a crime in Italy and a civil case was pending). 
242 For a wide-ranging account of international comity, see William S. Dodge, International Comity in 
American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (2015) (discussing various doctrines associated with 
prescriptive comity, adjudicative comity, and sovereign party comity as reflecting principles of restraint 
and principles of recognition).  
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is the threat of “destroy[ing] or substantially injur[ing] an industry in the United 
States” through the loss, in the United States, of a competitive advantage conferred 
by its secret technology.243 Accordingly, preventing the importation of articles that 
incorporate (or were produced using) what we term “U.S. trade secrets”—meaning 
information developed in the United States by a U.S. or foreign company—
represents a domestic application of the statute. Had the court followed that 
approach, it would have arrived at an analysis better tailored to the interests that 
Congress sought to protect in enacting section 337. In particular, a “focus” 
analysis avoids the potential broad extraterritorial application that troubled Judge 
Moore in applying section 337 to other types of cases.244  
While this interpretation would mean that information developed abroad 
will often not qualify for protection,245 support for this approach can be found in 
Congress’s focus on the importation of articles that threaten to “destroy or 
substantially injure [a domestic] industry” and on the concern section 337 evinces 
for promoting innovation and creating employment and training opportunities in 
the United States by preserving the U.S. market for holders of U.S. trade secrets. It 
is consistent with Congress’s decision not to provide for a global injunction, or 
another far-reaching remedial scheme.246 And it is consistent with international 
law, which requires WTO members to offer copyright and patent protection to 
works developed abroad, 247 but does not impose the same detailed obligation for 
trade secrets.248 In sum, both the restriction on triggering application of section 
337 (that there must be unlawful conduct in connection with importation and a 
domestic injury) and the scope of the remedy (national exclusion) support the view 
                                                 
243 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)(i) (2016). 
244 Cf. InterDigital Comm’ns, LLC v. ITC, 707 F.3d 1295, 1301, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting, in the 
context of interpreting the domestic injury requirement of section 337(a)(2), that the goal of section 337 
is to protect companies that “have a substantial stake in the United States” and have made significant 
investments in “engineering, research, and development”). 
245 See In the Matter of Certain Stainless Steel Products, discussed in note 241, supra. 
246 Cf. Google, Inc. v. Equustek Solutions, (2017) S.C.R. 36602 (Can.), see infra notes 302. 
247 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 27.1 (requiring WTO countries to recognize patent rights 
without discrimination as to the place of invention): Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 3.1 
(extending protection to authors who are nationals of the Berne Union and to works first published in 
the Union). 
248 See Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 3.1 and TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 39. In this 
respect, trade secrets are similar to trademarks, where international law contemplates local 
understanding or registration as a prerequisite to recognition, see TRIPS Agreement, arts. 15 and 16.  
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that a trade secret developed in the United States is the focus of the statute.249  
Furthermore, this approach emphasizes the salience of the U.S. regulatory interest 
in protecting U.S. trade secrets to justify application of section 337(a)(1)(A). To be 
sure, the cases do not always include information on where the secret at issue was 
developed. Presumably, if the place of development became an issue, evidence on 
the place of development would be introduced at trial. 
To put this another way, interpreting section 337 as focusing on the 
concept of a “U.S. trade secret” allows courts to confine the scope of the statute to 
situations where U.S. interests are paramount. Furthermore, it puts those exposed 
to these secrets on notice that U.S. law will apply to the question of importation. 
For example, in TianRui, the information was developed in the United States and 
then licensed to a firm in China, from which it was stolen; in Sino Legend, the 
transfer to China from a New York firm was even governed by a confidentiality 
agreement specifying the application of New York law. In such cases, U.S. 
interests would be frustrated if the secret could be freely used on products sold in 
the United States. Furthermore, the licensee (and, arguably, the misappropriator, if 
not a tippee) would have been aware of the provenance of the information and 
would therefore have known to conform their behavior to the U.S. approach to 
balancing interests in confidentiality, employee mobility, and investment. And 
because the potential application of U.S. rather than Chinese law may have been 
an important factor in the licensor’s initial decision to transfer the technology to 
China, the application of U.S. law furthers the licensor’s interests and promotes 
broad dissemination of new knowledge.   
                                                 
249 Of course, section 337(a)(1)(A)’s reference to “unfair methods of competition and unfair acts” 
includes more than simply theft of trade secrets. Our argument is thus limited to situations in which § 
337(a)(1)(A) is invoked in relation to trade secret misappropriation. Our view that it is appropriate to 
read § 337(a)(1)(A) to have a “focus” on a type of misconduct not explicitly named in the text of the 
statute finds indirect support in Nabisco, where the Court found “RICO gives a clear, affirmative 
indication that § 1962 applies to foreign racketeering activity—but only to the extent that the predicates 
alleged in a particular case themselves apply extraterritorially.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 
136 S.Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016). 
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In contrast, when the information is developed abroad and taken abroad 
for incorporation into products placed on the global market, it is difficult to see 
how the appropriation riggers the policies that support U.S. trade secrecy 
protection. Such cases are more akin to the situations that Judge Moore was 
concerned with in her dissent: they apply U.S. law to activity occurring entirely 
abroad; in many cases, the parties involved in the technology transfer may have 
had no reason to believe that U.S. law might apply and thus may have conformed 
their behavior on information sharing and use to the laws of the country in which 
they acted. U.S. law should, in short, have no place in policing their behavior. To 
be sure, there will also be intermediate cases. The trade secret may have been 
developed by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. firm, which might trigger a U.S. 
interest in promoting innovation, albeit in an attenuated way. Or the information 
may have been developed for customers in the United States.250 In that situation, 
there is a U.S. interest in the sense that promoting the advance would give U.S 
consumers more choice, but it is more difficult to consider these “U.S. trade 
secrets” because it is harder to classify that interest as the “focus” of the statute. 
Moreover, a party can protect itself by contracting for the application of U.S. law. 
It can also negotiate for an indemnity clause to cover situations where the forum 
state does not honor the choice of law provision or the information is transferred 
without alerting subsequent transferees to the obligation to keep the information 
secret. 
It is important to emphasize that in all these situations the statute permits 
the ITC or the court to apply a comity analysis, and the President to intervene on 
policy grounds to prevent the sorts of clashes that have concerned the Supreme 
Court. It is also worth noting that if section 337 were to be interpreted as focusing 
on only the secrets of U.S.-owned firms, it would likely violate the TRIPS 
obligation to accord to right holders in all WTO countries protection that is the 
same as that offered to U.S. right holders or the antidiscrimination requirements of 
the GATT.251 For that reason, we have noted the possibility of adopting a 
somewhat more generous interpretation to cover trade secrets developed in the 
United States, regardless of the nationality of the right holder or the source of the 
goods.  
 
B.     Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 
 
                                                 
250 See, e.g., UPI Semiconductor Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 767 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(statement of facts in Certain DC-DC Controller and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-698, 
2012 WL 6035709 (Enforcement Proceeding June 8, 2012)) (excluding goods made with trade secrets 
misappropriated (under the standard adopted in TianRui) by one Taiwanese firm from another 
Taiwanese firm). 
251 See supra note 49. 
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The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) is an amendment to the 
1996 Economic Espionage Act (EEA) that became effective May 11, 2016. As 
originally enacted, the EEA imposed criminal penalties for unauthorized takings to 
benefit foreign governments (“espionage”) or private parties (“theft”).252 The 
DTSA was enacted, principally, to provide a private right of action. The relevant 
provision – § 1836(b) – states that: “An owner of a trade secret that is 
misappropriated may bring a civil action under this subsection if the trade secret is 
related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign 
commerce.”253 Thus, it adds to the criminal statute a private federal cause of action 
for trade secret misappropriation when interstate or foreign commerce is involved, 
and provides for federal court jurisdiction in such actions. The federal remedies 
may include injunctive relief, damages, and the possibility of exemplary damages 
for willful and malicious appropriation up to two-times the actual damages 
proven.254 
Ostensibly, the extraterritorial reach of the DTSA is easily analyzed 
because section1837 of the original enactment, the EEA, includes a clear statement 
of legislative intent.  It specifies: 
This chapter also applies to conduct occurring outside the United 
States if  
(1) the offender is a natural person who is a citizen or 
permanent resident alien of the United States, or an 
organization organized under the laws of the United 
States or a State or political subdivision thereof; or 
(2) an act in furtherance of the offense was committed 
in the United States.255 
Since section 1836 is in “This chapter,” presumably the provision on 
extraterritoriality applies as well to the civil claims the statute creates.  
Indeed, section 5 of the DTSA states that it is the sense of Congress that 
“trade secret theft occurs in the United States and around the world” and 
that “trade secret theft, wherever it occurs, harms the companies that own 
the trade secrets and the employees of the companies.” It also adds that 
the Act “applies broadly to protect trade secrets from theft.”256 Thus it is 
possible that Congress meant to extend trade secrecy protection to acts of 
a U.S. national outside of the United States and to all situations where 
some act in furtherance of the misappropriation occurs in the United 
States.    
                                                 
252 The statute was revised several times to extend its reach and enhance deterrence, see Dreyfuss & 
Lobel. supra note 19. 
253 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(1) (2016). 
254 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3)(C). 
255 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18. U.S.C. § 1837 (1996).   
256 Pub. L. 104–294, 110 Stat. 3488, § 5(3) (2016). 
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Upon closer inspection, however, the case resembles Nabisco in that the 
relationship between the civil provision and the original criminal statute is not 
straightforward. Moreover, the ramifications of engrafting the extraterritorial 
provision of the criminal statute on to the civil cause of action leads to an 
astonishingly broad reach. The DTSA authorizes trade secret owners to bring civil 
claims for misappropriation of a trade secret. However, it does not supply 
autonomous definitions of these terms. Thus, in considering the extraterritorial 
reach of federal trade secret law, one possibility is that courts will use the 
definitions of wrongdoing found in sections 1831 and 1832 of the EEA. 
Alternatively, DTSA actions might be brought based on activity abroad as defined 
by state laws such as the UTSA. Because sections 1831 and 1832 cover such 
diverse actions as taking, copying, communicating, receiving, or possessing a 
trade secret, the DTSA could be interpreted to apply not only to unauthorized 
appropriations in the United States for use abroad, but also to: appropriations 
abroad for use in the United States; takings abroad for use abroad so long as part 
of the transmission of the information occurred in the United States; or any taking 
abroad by a U.S. national. Indeed, because these provisions include attempts and 
conspiracies,” the DTSA could arguably apply to inchoate activity. It might, for 
instance, be possible to bring a claim in the United States against a foreign firm 
whose employee took information from a former foreign employer and stored it on 
a U.S. server for use in his new position. Even if state-law definitions are used, 257 
the UTSA also includes a broad range of activity without any specificity as to 
where the actions take place.258 Thus, under either interpretation, U.S. trade 
secrecy law could indeed “rule the world”259 and police global business practices.  
As a practical matter, this is very different from how section 1837 of the 
EEA operates in criminal cases, where there are several mechanisms that limit the 
ambit of prosecution. First, prosecution is mediated through prosecutorial 
discretion, which as we saw, was an important factor in the Nabisco Court’s 
decision to distinguish between the civil and criminal sections of the RICO statute. 
Second, the reach of the EEA is cabined by the limits of criminal jurisdiction, 
where there is no such thing as long arm jurisdiction or the ability to satisfy 
                                                 
257 See H.R. Rep. 104-788, at 12 (1996) (referring to definitions under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act). 
However, the new private right of action indicates the intention is to “provide a single, national 
standard for trade secret misappropriation with clear rules and predictability for everyone involved,” 
H.R. Rep. No. 114-529, at 6 (2016) [hereinafter DTSA House Rep.]; see DTSA Sen. Rep., supra note 6 
(same), suggesting a federal standard is intended.  
258 See, e.g., InnoSys, Inc. v. Mercer, 2015 UT 80, 364 P.3d 1013 (Jan. 7, 2016) (basing a violation of 
the UTSA on a presumption of harm); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) (basing 
recovery on a theory of inevitable disclosure). 
259 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007). See also James Pooley, How to Recruit 
and Hire While Avoiding Data Contamination, ORRICK TRADE SECRETS WATCH (27 Feb. 2017), 
http://www.pooley.com/single-post/2017/02/01/How-To-Recruit-And-Hire-While-Avoiding-Data-
Contamination (noting that “in a survey by Symantec, over half of employees who left their jobs 
reported keeping data that belonged to their employers”). 
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judgments with assets found in the United States, as in civil cases.260 To be sure, 
alleged criminal misappropriators can be indicted even if not physically present in 
the United States. But to be tried, they must be extradited, and extradition is 
difficult. It requires a treaty with the country in which the misappropriator is 
found. Furthermore, virtually all U.S. extradition treaties apply only when the 
conduct charged would also be a crime under local law.261 The employee in a 
criminal analogue to Sino Legend, for example, could not be extradited (even if the 
United States had an extradition treaty with China) once the Chinese courts 
decided the activities at issue did not constitute a trade secrecy violation. Third, 
although the criminal provisions of the EEA include the possibility of an award of 
injunctive relief to protect the trade secrecy holder, they do not authorize an award 
of damages.262 Even the availability of an injunction is highly constrained: it must 
be obtained by the Attorney General (thus, it is subject to prosecutorial discretion) 
and the statute says it must be “appropriate,” suggesting that the Attorney General 
should consider comity factors. In practice, it is notable that criminal prosecution 
under the EEA has generally involved purely domestic misappropriators or foreign 
nationals who have taken information acquired in the United States for use 
abroad.263 
The absence of mechanisms to cabin the reach of the federal trade secret 
statute is not the only reason to think that Congress did not fully consider the 
interaction between section 1837, on extraterritoriality, and section 1836(b), on 
civil liability. While it is true that there is a reference in section 1836(b) to 
“foreign commerce,” we have seen that such language has generally not been 
sufficient to overcome a presumption against extraterritorial application.264  
Furthermore, section 1837 was not amended when section 1836 was changed by 
the adoption of the DTSA.  Indeed, the references in section 1837 to “offender” 
and “offense,” not “infringer” or “infringement,” suggest that Congress had not 
affirmatively considered the relationship between the two sections, as envisioned 
by Nabisco.265 Also, to the extent that Congress has addressed concerns about 
                                                 
260 See William S. Dodge, The Structural Rules of Transnational Law, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 
317, 318 (2003) (noting that jurisdictional rules, coupled with the fact that many defendants have assets 
in the United States, gives the U.S. broad prescriptive authority). But see Robin J. Effron, Trade 
Secrets, Extraterritoriality, and Jurisdiction, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765 (2016) (noting that the 
reach of personal jurisdiction under the DTSA may be insufficient to reach defendants who leave the 
United States before their misappropriation is discovered, and that forum non conveniens dismissals 
will also cabin the reach of DTSA actions). 
261  See Michael John Garcia & Charles Doyle, Extradition to and from the United States: Overview of 
the Law and Recent Treaties, CONG. RES. SERV. 1 & 10 (2010). See also James Freedman, Protecting 
State Secrets as Intellectual Property: A Strategy for Prosecuting Wikileaks, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 185, 
208 (2012). 
262 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a) (2016).  
263 See Dreyfuss & Lobel, supra note 19. 
264 See supra notes 202-203 and accompanying text.  
265 Nabisco, 136 S.Ct., at 2108 (“It is not enough to say that a private right of action must reach abroad 
because the underlying law governs conduct in foreign countries”). 
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conflicts in the remedial provisions in paragraph (b)(3) of section 1836, it is 
puzzling that it considered only potential conflicts with state laws. The statute and 
legislative history refer to U.S. state law (such as the Uniform Trade Secrets Act) 
but do not mention foreign laws.266  For example, the provision includes 
limitations on the issuance of an injunction; one of those limitations refers to “an 
applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, 
trade, or business.”   Significantly, the concern about “conflict” does not deal with 
the interplay between trade secrecy and patent policy, which would be a problem 
if foreign misappropriation were included, but is not necessary in the state context 
because states do not have their own patent law or policy. Finally, the statute 
includes a requirement that the Under Secretary of Commerce report to Congress 
on whether U.S. companies can adequately protect their trade secrets abroad, and 
recommend ways to assist them in reducing the risk of loss.267 If the statute were 
applicable to foreign thefts and harms, the need for such a report would be greatly 
diminished. 
In short, the absence of clarity within the statute leads to the same 
problem that we saw in TianRui—a failure to provide a sharp analysis of the 
extraterritorial reach of the statute. A scope that includes protection for any trade 
secret, irrespective of where the information was developed, or who developed it, 
or where it was stolen or used, would be exorbitant and would raise Judge Moore’s 
concern that the United States has no right “to determine what business practices, 
conducted entirely abroad, are unfair.”268 Moreover, unlike section 337 actions, 
which are limited to exclusion orders, or EEA injunctions, which are within the 
scope of prosecutorial discretion, a claim for injunctive relief under the DTSA 
depends on the decision of private parties, and it is available “to prevent any actual 
or threatened misappropriation … on such terms as the court deems reasonable,” 
so long as it does not conflict with certain State business laws.269 Analogously, 
damages can be awarded for “actual loss caused by the misappropriation” as well 
as for unjust enrichment.”270 Thus it appears courts can award injunctions with 
extraterritorial effect and damages to compensate for losses in foreign markets. 
Courts might react to the ambiguities in section 1837’s application to the 
DTSA in one of two ways. They could decide that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is overcome by the inclusion of the DTSA in the EAA. While 
that approach would give the DTSA a broad reach, courts could consider 
prescriptive comity limits to avoid serious clashes with foreign law. One 
consequence of such comity concerns would be to limit injunctive relief to the 
U.S. market and monetary relief to losses suffered in the United States.   
                                                 
266 See DTSA House Report, supra note 257, at 12. 
267 DTSA, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 114th Congress 1st Sess. § 5 (2016). 
268 TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1338 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
269 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (2016). 
270 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B) (2016). 
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Alternatively, courts might determine that the lesson of Morrison, Kiobel, 
Nabisco, and Microsoft is that the presumption of extraterritoriality is strong and 
must be applied strictly and with specificity to each provision in a legislative 
scheme, that it can be overcome only by an express indication of intent, and that 
no such expression can be found in the civil provisions of the DTSA. To determine 
whether the DTSA has a domestic application in a particular case, the court would 
then turn to the focus of the statute. The trademark cases starting with Bulova and 
refined in Vanity Fair and Trader Joe’s could be read to suggest that the focus of 
that statute is the protection of a U.S. company from injury caused by the 
infringement of its U.S. trademark. The analogy could prove helpful here and 
suggest a similar domestic focus in trade secret cases. The House Report on the 
DTSA states that Congress was motivated to deal with theft “harmful to United 
States companies” and notes that “the trade secrets of American companies are 
increasingly at risk,”271  suggesting that the focus of the statute is the 
misappropriation of a U.S. company’s trade secret. Prescriptive comity would then 
allow consideration of any serious conflicts with foreign law, particularly with 
regard to remedial provisions that extend beyond the territory of the United States.  
Under this interpretation, the statute would be of much more limited scope.  
However, as with section 337, the interpretation might then raise concerns under 
international law, for it would arguably discriminate between foreign and domestic 
right holders.272 Once again, a broader interpretation U.S. trade secret, to include 
trade secrets developed in the United States by foreign or domestic firms may 
avoid this problem.   
 
C.     State Trade Secret Law 
 
The DTSA states expressly that it does not “preempt any other provision 
of law,” whether civil or criminal, and thus trade secret owners can usually choose 
whether to seek a remedy under federal or state law.273 The fact that state law may 
offer an alternative remedy invites an inquiry whether state trade secret law can 
cover claims that federal law cannot reach, such as claims involving conduct that 
mainly takes place abroad. Curiously, courts hearing state trade secrecy cases have 
said very little about extraterritoriality. In some states, protection remains a matter 
of common law (or was a matter of common law when key precedents were 
decided). In those cases, courts have (or had) no occasion to consider legislative 
intent concerning the projected scope of a statute. Most states have now adopted 
the UTSA, which does not contain an express statement of territorial reach. 
Although there are certainly theoretical reasons and case law suggesting that 
courts should adopt a presumption that state statutes do not extend beyond the 
boundaries of the enacting jurisdiction,274 as well as reason to think judges should 
                                                 
271 DTSA Senate Rep., supra note 6, at 12; DTSA House Rep., supra note 257, at 3. 
272 See supra note 49. 
273 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (f). (There is one exception for whistleblowers. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b).) 
274 See, e.g., N. Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 4 (Cal. 1916) (“Ordinarily the statutes of a 
state have no force beyond its boundaries.”). 
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be even more circumspect when applying state law to conduct outside the United 
States,275 courts rarely reason in these terms. 276 Not all courts agree that there is a 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of state law.277 Furthermore, 
unlike federal cases, which are dismissed once a determination is made that the 
scope of the statute in question does not extend to the facts of the case, in state 
cases courts consider “multiple potentially applicable laws and ultimately . . . 
select one to resolve the case.”278 Thus courts hearing state cases will, in the end, 
most likely look to traditional choice of law principles to determine the 
appropriate law and then adjudicate the case under that law (or laws).   
The few transnational trade secret cases that address choice of law follow 
this pattern. Both state courts and federal courts hearing state law cases generally 
say nothing about a presumption against extraterritorial application or the 
prescriptive scope of the statute.279 Indeed, some barely consider the choice of law 
question.  As noted in the Introduction, in E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. 
Kolon Industries, Inc.,280 a claim was made that the defendant, a Korean firm, 
received information on the secret methods for manufacturing Kevlar (the fiber in 
bullet-proof vests), which had been developed by an American company, Dupont. 
The district court applied Virginia law (the Uniform Trade Secrets Act) without 
much analysis.281     
                                                 
275 See, e.g., Denty v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 907 F. Supp. 879, 886 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (“The 
rationale for this reluctance [to overcome the presumption in federal cases]—respect for the 
sovereignty of other nations within their territories—should make courts even more reluctant to apply 
state law outside the boundaries of the United States”). 
276 See generally, Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the 
Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. 535, 551–53 (2012). 
277 See Hannah Buxbaum, Determining the Territorial Scope of State Law in Interstate and 
International Conflicts: Comments on the Draft Restatement (Third) and on the Role of Party 
Autonomy, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 381, 390 (2017). 
278 Id. at 395–96. 
279 But see Westco Sci. Instruments, Inc. v. Georgiou, No. CV064005637S, 2006 WL 1828628, at *2 
n.2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 21, 2006) (expressing doubt that Connecticut’s version of the UTSA has 
extraterritorial effect). 
280 894 F. Supp. 2d 691, 695 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
281 It appears that  Kolon obtained the information from a Dupont employee living in Virginia, see 
Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Kolon Industries Inc. Pleads Guilty for Conspiring to 
Steal DuPont Trade Secrets Involving Kevlar Technology (April 20, 2015)(describing a subsequent 
criminal case), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kolon-industries-inc-pleads-guilty-conspiring-steal-
dupont-trade-secrets-involving-kevlar and Kolon, 894 F. Supp., at 695. 
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Other courts have analyzed the question in somewhat more traditional 
choice of law terms; they have, for example adopted the choice of law analysis 
used in tort cases and debated whether to apply the law of the place of conduct or 
injury. One such example is BP Chemicals, Ltd. v. Formosa Chemical & Fibre 
Corporation,282 in which Formosa, a Taiwanese corporation was alleged to have 
entered into a contract with a New Jersey company to manufacture parts based on 
trade secrets taken from BP, a British corporation, and ultimately to be used in the 
construction of an acetic acid plant in Taiwan. At the time, New Jersey took a 
common law approach to trade secrecy cases and the court applied a choice of law 
analysis, identifying the relevant issues as (1) whether BP’s proprietary 
information was protectable and had not returned to the public domain by the time 
it was taken and (2) whether acquisition of the alleged trade secret in Taiwan was 
wrongful.283   
To decide what law to apply, the court focused on where the trade secret 
was taken and where it was licensed. It held that Taiwan had the greater interest in 
setting the standards as to whether information had been sufficiently safeguarded 
and whether it had entered the public domain. The court explained that the issue 
implicated policy judgments regarding the appropriate balance between protecting 
trade secrets, thereby encouraging the development of new technology, the 
willingness of a foreign company to share their technology with Taiwanese 
business, and promoting free interchange and access to information, which had 
profound implications for the health of the Taiwanese economy. Similarly, the 
court determined that Taiwan had the greater interest in determining whether a 
Taiwanese company acted tortiously in acquiring BP’s information in Taiwan, and 
in particular, the circumstances under which a Taiwanese company shared 
information with its employees. Although BP alleged that the misconduct took 
place in New Jersey—the fabrication of equipment using misappropriated 
technical specifications—the court stated that such conduct had no relevance to the 
analysis.  Rather the court found that the majority of the relevant conduct occurred 
in Taiwan where the trade secrets were licensed and where the information was 
acquired. It then instructed the trial court to take evidence on Taiwanese law. As to 
New Jersey law, the court noted that New Jersey was not the principal situs of 
either the direct or indirect injury inflicted; and as to English law, the court did not 
believe that the law at the place of injury should be given great weight in cases 
arising out of claims of misappropriation of trade value.284 
                                                 
282 229 F.3d 254, 257 (3rd Cir. 2000).   
283 Id. at 265. 
284 Id. at 265–66. 
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The emphasis on where the trade secret was taken is arguably consistent 
with the position taken by the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. Section 145 of 
the Restatement adopts the law of the state that has the “most significant 
relationship to the parties and the transaction” with respect to the particular issue 
in question.285 Although in many tort cases it is the place of injury that is identified 
as the state with the “most significant relationship,” particularly when that law 
permits recovery, comment f to section 145 addresses the tort of “misappropriation 
of trade values” more specifically, stating that it is the “principal location of the 
defendant’s conduct” that usually will be given the greatest weight in determining 
the state whose local law determines the rights and liabilities that arise from the 
tort. Comment f is, however, somewhat ambiguous in transnational cases.  First, 
“conduct” can occur in more than one location. The defendant might have taken 
the secret where it was developed, but used it in another location or taken it in a 
place where the trade secrecy holder licensed it and used it in a third country. In 
those circumstances, it is not clear which place should be regarded as the 
“principal location” of the conduct. Moreover, as described in Part I, the tort of 
trade secret misappropriation involves legal issues on which there is substantial 
disagreement among jurisdictions. In BP Chemicals, the bulk of the activities 
occurred in Taiwan so once the court decided to use a conduct rule, it was 
straightforward to apply Taiwanese law on all the issues relevant to that case.  But 
when activities span several jurisdictions, it is not clear whether comment f 
includes a dépeçage approach. For example, comment f might be understood as 
pointing to the law of the place of acquisition to determine whether, at the time of 
acquisition, the information was secret, subject to reasonable efforts to maintain 
secrecy, and taken by improper means; to the law of the place where a tip was 
communicated to determine tippee liability; and to the law of the place of use to 
determine questions regarding the lawfulness of the use.286   
From the perspective of innovation policy, coupling the dépeçage 
approach with some version of the conduct rule has a great deal to recommend it. 
If the goal of the law is to promote scientific and technological progress, it is 
important that new scientific developments and technical advances can be fully 
exploited. To avoid chilling legitimate uses, those in contact with information 
must know whether it can be freely taken and used. Applying the law of the state 
where conduct relevant to that inquiry takes place arguably accomplishes that 
purpose. Of course, trade secrecy holders may wish to develop, use, and license 
information in places that lack adequate protection. They can, however, often 
protect themselves with agreements that provide for the application of the law of a 
different location. As long as those who learn the information know the terms 
under which they are in possession of it, they can understand the limits of its use.  
                                                 
285 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
286 Other issues, such as ownership, would necessitate their own conflicts analysis. 
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On the other hand, if one considers the policies underlying the field of 
trade secrets and certain practical realities of global business, a strong argument 
can be made that the applicable law on most issues should be that of the place 
where the trade secret was developed and the loss of the opportunity to capture 
revenue on account of the innovation might be said to be incurred.287 If the law of 
the place of development permits recovery, it is presumably because the state has a 
policy of encouraging innovation and business development by protecting trade 
secrets. Of course, the state where the information was taken may have a different 
policy: it might deny recovery (by determining that the information was not a trade 
secret, that it was not adequately protected, or that it was not wrongly shared) in 
order to encourage employee mobility and information exchange, thereby allowing 
others to build on existing information and push forward the frontiers of 
knowledge. Such cases present the paradigm of the “true conflict” and the question 
remains as to which of these policies should give way to the other.288 For reasons 
explained below, we favor the place of development over the place of conduct. 
                                                 
287 See PETER HAY, PATRICK BORCHERS & SYMEON SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 997 (5th ed. 
2010) (arguing that applicable law should be the place where the claimant was injured in its business). 
288We use the term “true conflict” as it is used in the contemporary conflicts of laws literature, meaning 
that the relevant states have different policies and more than one state has a policy that is furthered in 
the particular factual pattern presented. A converse situation to the one presented in the text also 
presents a true conflict. When the place of development does not provide protection (for example, if it 
favors employee mobility over providing incentives to innovate) but the state where the information 
was used does provide protection (for example, because it wants to encourage technology transfer), we 
believe the law of the place of development should nonetheless apply. Presumably, the availability of 
trade secret protection was not what motivated the developer to invest in the technology at issue. 
Admittedly, the policy in technology transfer is then subordinated to the policy of employee mobility.  
Such a rule can be defended in order to adopt a coherent choice of law principle through an evaluation 
of the competing policies. To the extent to which there is disagreement about this evaluation of 
competing policies, one could argue for a rule that the law of the state with the greater protection 
always applies, subject to a foreseeability requirement.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2017) (providing that as to issues of conduct regulation 
when the conduct in one state causes injury in another, the law of the state of conduct governs the issue, 
but if the location of the injury was foreseeable, the injured person may select the law of the state of 
injury); Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Law Applicable to Products Liability (providing 
for the law of the State of the victim’s habitual residence to apply when it is also the State of the 
principal place of business of the person claimed to be liable or the place where the product was 
acquired; if those criteria are not met the applicable law is the internal law of the State of the place of 
injury if it is also the State of the victim’s habitual residence or State of the principal place of business 
of the personal claimed to be liable or the place where the product was acquired; and if none of these 
criteria are met, the applicable law is that of the State of the principal place of business of the person 
claimed to be liable, unless the plaintiff bases the claim upon the law of the State of the place of injury. 
In all cases the applicable law is subject to a limitation if the person claimed to be liable could not 
reasonably have foreseen that the produce would be available in that State).  There are other 
permutations where under contemporary choice of law analysis only one state may be said to have a 
relevant policy to be furthered and is thus considered a “false conflict.” Here, however, we consider 
only the paradigm examples. 
First, one must consider the context in which trade secret exploitation—
and theft—now takes place. Today, businesses are subjected to a greater volume 
of, and more varied, threats to their trade secrets from both inside and outside the 
company.243 More than an employee who takes a physical box of files (or walks 
off the job with knowledge that constitutes a trade secret), a 21st century trade 
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secret misappropriator may well use an electronic medium—perhaps even 
accessing the relevant files remotely.
289 In such a technological environment, it is not clear that the conduct 
rule works as intended.290 For example, take the case of files containing trade 
secrets being stored on Dropbox or a similar cloud computing service.291 In one 
such case, one defendant ex-employee had installed Dropbox on their company 
computer, where it was used to store and access files containing trade secrets, and 
also linked three personal devices to the Dropbox account (an Android phone, an 
iPad, and a personal iMac).292 Another defendant ex-employee accessed the same 
files via personal email, while traveling on the company’s behalf and working 
remotely.293  
The defendants in this case left a clear trail: they transferred large 
numbers of files between and to themselves near their dates of resignation.294 But 
the facts of the case illustrate a broader point: under a conduct rule that emphasizes 
the place of appropriation, the applicable law might change depending on which 
jurisdiction the employee was in when she accessed the protected files for the 
purpose of appropriation, rather than for working remotely. Worse still for the 
conduct rule, the plaintiff might provide log-in credentials for the cloud service to 
a third party who themselves accessed the files from a different jurisdiction. Under 
such a scenario, would the act of appropriation be the provision of log-in 
credentials, or the downloading of the files? Given the reality of data access and 
transmission in the world of cloud computing, with multiple devices and access 
points, a savvy appropriator could “shop” for the least protective trade secret law, 
and then misappropriate strategically from within that jurisdiction. Indeed, the 
“migratory appropriator” is not merely speculative: in some cases, employees have 
accessed cloud storage accounts after departing the company, once they reside in 
                                                 
289 See, e.g., Molly Hubbard Cash, Keep It Secret, Keep It Safe: Protecting Trade Secrets by Revisiting 
the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Federal Law, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 263, 264 (2016) (listing 
“electronically stored information,” “the use of portable devices . . . increasing the number of operating 
systems and endpoints that hackers can use,” and “Cloud-based technologies” as among the changes in 
business practices that facilitate trade secret misappropriation). 
290 The rationale set forth in comment f, for example, assumes that the place of the defendant’s 
misappropriation is the “most important” contact with the “greatest weight”—a characterization 
inconsistent with it being fortuitous, strategic, or multiple. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF 
LAWS § 145 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
291 A cloud computing service allows for information transfer between devices that can access remotely 
stored information using login credentials for a user-linked account unique to the cloud service (e.g., a 
Dropbox account, a Google Drive account). 
292 Free Country Ltd v. Drennen, 235 F. Supp. 3d 559, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).  
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 563–564. Another interesting wrinkle in the case is that although the court did not credit the 
defendant’s proclaimed innocent purpose for transferring the files (to review them for personal 
information), the court denied a temporary restraining order request because the files had been deleted 
only days later. Id.  
56https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol8/iss2/4
321                          CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW                       [265:321]               
 
 
another jurisdiction and work for a new company located there.295 
Second, we disfavor the conduct rule in this context for reasons that are 
more fundamental than the application challenges posed by modern technological 
realities. Just as the archetypal threats (e.g. hackers, remote access via cloud 
computing) are now global, so too are the activities of the archetypal business 
involved in trade secret litigation. In the domestic tort context, there is something 
to be said for the idea that a party bears some risk when they leave behind the 
more favorable policy of their own jurisdiction—for example, by driving into an 
adjacent sister state.296 However, that rationale is less persuasive when the default 
modus operandi and typical case is one involving transnational business activity. 
In the transnational business context, it is not useful to think in terms of the trade 
secret leaving the protection of the corporation’s domicile to enter another 
jurisdiction. Instead, a corporation develops a trade secret to exploit it globally in 
its business operations.  For these reasons, we favor a place of development rule 
over a place of conduct rule, at least on the questions of whether the information 
qualifies as a trade secret and was adequately protected and taken unlawfully.297  
This rule assures firms that their secrets will be protected and creates the 
strongest incentive to invest in information development. The downside is that it is 
not always easy to determine where information was developed or exactly who 
developed it. For example, it may have been developed in increments, in several 
places where the firm does business; it may have been developed jointly by a 
group of employees working in different places or by several firms acting in 
concert. This uncertainty poses difficulties for adjudicators. Moreover, the 
inability to determine what law applies presents a problem for anyone seeking to 
use the information. In such a situation, a subsidiary rule may be necessary. 
Accordingly, the applicable law should be the law of the place where the secret 
was developed and thus where the trade secrecy holder suffered injury, provided 
that the defendant could foresee, at the time it acquired or used the information, 
that this law would be applied. In cases where the place of injury could not have 
been foreseen, courts should apply, at least on the issues mentioned above issues, 
the law of the place where the information was taken. Once again, the trade 
secrecy holder will often be able to protect itself with a choice of law provision 
                                                 
295 Estes Forwarding Worldwide LLC v. Cuellar, 239 F. Supp. 3d 918, 921 (E.D. Va. 2017) (discussing 
Virginia-based employee who left Virginia employer and moved to Washington State, whereinafter he 
accessed an account containing protected information of his previous employer). Although the suit in 
this case was brought under computer fraud laws, the scenario resembles a common trade secret case 
fact pattern. 
296 For example, under Cavers’ principles of preference, a defendant from state A, who entered a state 
B with more protective tort laws and injured a plaintiff domiciled there, would be subject to the more 
protective law; by contrast, a plaintiff from state C, who entered state D with less protective tort laws 
and was injured by a defendant domiciled there, would not be able to subject the defendant to the more 
protective laws of state C. See DAVID CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 114–224 (1965).   
297 Cf. Innovia v Frito-Lay [2012] EWHC 790 (Pat) (breach of confidence case with contacts in 
England, Delaware, and Texas; applicable law determined to be England, the place of development, 
albeit chosen on a different theory than the one proposed here). Note that, at least in some cases, the 
law applicable to the question of whether the information was improperly used would be decided under 
the law of the place of use. An example might be tippee liability, where an independent policy of the 
place of use might include encouraging the tippee’s investment.   
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(and an indemnity agreement from the licensee). 
The choice of any single law that permits recovery and permits global 
damages and/or broad injunctive relief appears to permit that law to rule the world 
with respect to the relevant issues. However, because the choice-of-law analysis 
represents a balance of competing policies, global damages do not seem 
unwarranted. 298 There is also authority in the U.S. cases for broad injunctive 
relief. For example, in the Kolon case, where the court applied Virginia law to 
permit recovery by a U.S. company against a Korean company where the Korean 
firm had received information about a secret method apparently developed in the 
United States, the court permitted broad injunctive relief and prohibited the 
Korean firm from selling materials made with Kevlar worldwide, including in 
South Korea. In authorizing the injunction, the court noted that the loss of trade 
secrets harmed an American corporation, the defendant had tried to sell its 
products in the United States, that some aspects of the misappropriation occurred 
in the United States; and that both the Virginia Uniform Act and South Korean law 
permitted injunctive relief, indicating lack of a conflict.299 Although it is not clear 
that South Korea would have authorized trade secret protection on these facts and 
imposed relief for sales in South Korea, if the defendants knew the information 
was developed in the United States, we believe the court would be fully justified in 
ordering complete relief for infringement of the trade secret. 
Global injunctive relief can also be defended because it may be the only 
way to fully protect the trade secret holder. For example, in Nordson Corp. v. 
Plasschaert300 the defendant had breached a non-compete agreement by showing 
the Ohio plaintiff’s secret plans to a firm in Europe. In awarding injunctive relief 
that extended to Western Europe and Canada, the court stated that “most 
confidential information is worthy of protection without geographic limitation 
because once divulged the information or the fruits of the information quickly can 
pass to competitors anywhere in the word.301 Global injunctions may be especially 
necessary in situations where the information, or material embodying the 
information, is distributed on the internet. Putting aside the fact that this injunction 
was ordered against a third party and not the misappropriator of the trade secret, 
Google, Inc. v. Equustek Solutions302 highlights the need for global injunctions in 
that context. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed an interlocutory 
                                                 
298 But cf. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that 
even after the liability portion of a statute is found to apply extraterritorially, a question remains as to 
whether the remedial provision allows recovery of worldwide lost profits), cert granted, No. 16-1011, 
2018 WL 386561 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018).  See also RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 
2108 (2016). 
299 See Kolon, 894 F. Supp. at 713 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 44, cmt 
d, which suggests that “[g]eographic limitations on the scope of injunctive relief on trade secret cases 
are ordinarily inappropriate.”).  
300 674 F.2d 1371, 1373–74 (11th Cir. 1982). 
301 Id. at 1377. 
302 36603, SCC 34, upheld, ¶11 (Supreme Court of Canada, 2017), https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-
csc/scc-csc/en/item/16701/index.do. 
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decision ordering Google to delist websites where goods designed and 
manufactured with a misappropriated trade secrets were being sold (and passed 
off). The court acknowledged the international comity concerns involved in an 
injunctive order that interferes with freedom of expression. The majority 
nonetheless reasoned that the injunction was appropriate: 
Where it is necessary to ensure the injunction’s effectiveness, a court can 
grant an injunction enjoining conduct anywhere in the world. The 
problem in this case is occurring online and globally. The Internet has no 
borders — its natural habitat is global. The only way to ensure that the 
interlocutory injunction attained its objective was to have it apply where 
Google operates — globally. If the injunction were restricted to Canada 
alone or to google.ca, the remedy would be deprived of its intended 
ability to prevent irreparable harm, since purchasers outside Canada could 
easily continue purchasing from D’s websites, and Canadian purchasers 
could find D’s websites even if those websites were de-indexed on 
google.ca.303 
 
Significantly, the Canadian Supreme Court also envisioned the possibility that 
Google could obtain a variance of the injunction by showing that it conflicted with 
the laws or policies of another jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is quite possible that 
other jurisdictions would decline to enforce the judgment on public policy 
grounds.304 Finally, because injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, there is room 
for the issuing court to take comity considerations into account.   
   
D.     The DTSA, Reconsidered  
 
No matter which of the conflict of law rules discussed above is adopted 
for state trade secrecy cases, it represents an approach that is preferable to 
imposing the extraterritoriality analysis – whereby courts decide either that U.S. 
law applies or they dismiss – on the DTSA. After all, the DTSA is itself heavily 
based on state law. Indeed, the Uniform Act codified a common law tort (the tort 
of misappropriation). The advantage in using the conflicts approach is that it 
would offer better protection to the competitive environment in the United States. 
As we saw in our previous discussion of the DTSA,305 the extraterritoriality 
analysis permits recovery only when a US trade secret is misappropriated: 
otherwise, the case is dismissed. Even if the concept of a “U.S. trade secret” is 
defined expansively, information developed outside the United States will 
generally not qualify for protection. Under the applicable law rule we suggest for 
state cases, courts in the United States could retain the case and accord relief when 
development occurred in any place with a protective regime. In places with law 
                                                 
303 Id. 
304 See, e.g., Google LLC v. Equustek Sols. Inc., No. 5:17-CV-04207-EJD, 2017 WL 5000834 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 2, 2017) (granting a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement in the United States of the 
Canadian court order). 
305 See supra notes 269–270. 
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akin to that of the United States (for example, EU states that have implemented the 
Directive), the case might be decided quite similarly.306 Even under the residual 
rule that looks to the place of conduct, U.S. courts can accord relief when the 
behavior occurred in a protective state. Of course, this choice of law approach 
does mean that a court in the United States will render judgment for the defendant 
when the content of the applicable law is that no relief is available. 
We do not believe that interpreting the DTSA in this way is foreclosed by 
the Morrison line of cases. The extraterritoriality approach appears to have 
evolved because U.S. courts do not consider themselves competent to decide cases 
under the public law of another country.307 However, the public-law nature of 
intellectual property law is, in other contexts, giving way to the notion that private 
rights are at stake.308 Thus, where at one time patent cases were considered 
nonarbitrable,309 Congress has since provided for voluntary arbitration of 
infringement actions.310 Moreover, private rights language is often found in 
intellectual property cases. For example, in United States v. Martignon, the Second 
Circuit distinguished between a criminal anti-bootlegging statute and copyright 
legislation on the ground that the latter was designed to “allocate rights,” whereas 
the former regulated behavior.311 In copyright, some federal courts have 
entertained foreign copyright claims under diversity jurisdiction or as 
supplemental to a claim under federal law and do not automatically dismiss 
foreign claims on forum non conveniens grounds, (suggesting they do not see them 
as public law cases).312 Significantly, other countries—the EU and the UK—
                                                 
306 It is, however, worth nothing that procedural differences, such as different rights to discovery, may 
lead to different outcomes in different jurisdictions. Statutes of limitation may also differ. 
307 Vanity Fair is an example: once the court decided not to apply U.S. law to the Canadian facts at 
issue in the case, it dismissed in favor of Canada. Similarly, in Voda v. Cordis Corporation, 476 F.3d 
887 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the court refused to entertain patent claims under foreign law.  In registered rights 
cases an added complication is that the act of examination and registration is sometimes considered an 
act of state.  See Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 646; ALI Principles,    supra 45, § 102, cmt. c. 
308 Cf. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 639 Fed. Appx. 639, cert. granted, 
2017 U.S. LEXIS 3727 (2017) on the question of whether a patent is a private right that cannot be 
extinguished in an administrative proceeding. 
309 See, e.g., Beckman Instruments v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970). 
310 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2012). 
311 492 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007). 
312 See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 
1998); London Film Prods. v. Intercontinental Comms., 580 F. Supp. 47, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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have concurred in this approach and have entertained foreign copyright actions 
when related to domestic claims.313 As we have seen, U.S. courts have applied 
foreign trade secrecy laws in numerous situations.  
A more conceptual objection to the use of conflicts principles rather than 
an extraterritoriality analysis has been voiced by William Dodge.314 In his view, 
courts do not have an easy time determining which law ought to apply to a case 
with multiple national contacts. Rather than taking on that task (and requiring the 
parties to shoulder the burden of proving foreign law), the international system is 
better off if courts rely only on local law—either they should decide it applies 
extraterritorially, or they should refrain from adjudicating. If this creates problems, 
he posits that nations will negotiate international agreements. While this approach 
has much to recommend it in theory, it falls short with respect to intellectual 
property. As we have seen, it is often difficult to reify and localize intangible 
rights. Nor do international instruments solve the problem. Intellectual property 
has been the subject of international agreements for over a century. However, in 
all that time, the best that countries have done is to agree on minimum standards of 
protection. As Part I demonstrated, such standards leave a great deal of room for 
national variation. Countries could alternatively negotiate agreements on private 
international law, including choice of law.315 Notably, the EU has adopted several 
conventions but they do not solve the problem for trade secrecy because countries 
differ on whether these claims sound in tort, contract, or property.316 Significantly, 
the EU’s new Directive on trade secrecy, although it clearly contemplates cross 
border cases, neither fully harmonizes the law (it is not a Regulation), nor does it 
provide rules on what law applies to such disputes. Given this vacuum, the DTSA 
offers the possibility for federal courts to develop a choice of law rule for federal 








                                                 
313 See, e.g., in the EU, Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard Verlags et al., 2011 E.C.R. and in the UK, 
Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39. Even for registered rights cases, the EU and UK have 
permitted the assertion of foreign claims when validity is not in issue, see, e.g., Case C-616/10, Solvay 
SA v. Honeywell Fluorine Products BV, 2012 E.C.R.; Actavis Group hf v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2013] 
EWCA Civ 517. See also Innovia Films Ltd. v. Frito-Lay North America Inc., EWHC 790 (Pat. 2012) 
(entertaining a patent and breach of confidence case involving U.S and European patents as and 
contacts in Georgia, Delaware, Texas, and England). 
314 William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial 
Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 153−69 (1998).  
315 See ALI Principles, supra note 45, at 3. 
316 The relevant conventions are Rome I and Rome II, supra note 46. 
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Because the social welfare effects of trade secrecy protection are 
indeterminate, it is not surprising that countries that are all bound by the TRIPS 
Agreement have reached different conclusions on the details of trade secrecy 
causes of action. Nonetheless, there was a period of time when U.S. courts tended 
to routinely apply its domestic trade secrecy laws to reach activity outside U.S. 
territory. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has emphasized the 
importance of interpreting U.S. laws in ways that avoid clashes among national 
laws. In this article, we consider the choice of law principles that should guide 
decisions on applicable trade secrecy law based on our perceptions of innovation 
and conflicts policy. To be sure, much depends on context and there are three 
ways that trade secrecy claims can be brought: through actions for exclusion order 
in the International Trade Commission; under federal trade secrecy law; and under 
state law. We suggest that because the ITC provides a remedy that affects only 
U.S. markets, the United States can always apply its own law to U.S. trade 
secrets—trade secrets developed in the United States. In other contexts, we believe 
courts should have the ability to apply U.S. or foreign law based on the principle 
that the law of the place of development of the trade secret governs if it is 
foreseeable by the defendant. If not, the applicable law is the place where the 
defendant took the secret.   
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